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Property War: Prostitution, Red-Light
Districts, and the Transformation of
Public Nuisance Law in the Progressive
Era
Peter C. Hennigan*
San Francisco, September 14, 19151
As the sun began to set over the Pacific, Bascom Johnson, on leave
from the American Social Hygiene Association, left his Berkeley
apartment at 2248 Blake Street to make the long trip across the San
Francisco Bay. Sometimes he was joined by Thomas D. Eliot,' but tonight
he was alone. Eliot had told him of a place he should visit - 9 Beckett
Street. Upon debarking from the ferry, Johnson made his way along
Broadway Street in the direction of Chinatown. By now, the fog had rolled
in and the temperatures had begun to drop. Like so many other men of his
generation Johnson was headed towards the city's infamous red-light
district - the Barbary Coast,3 which bordered the Chinese Business
J.D. Recipient, Yale Law School, 2001.
1. Facts together with probable inferences taken from the Affidavits of Bascom Johson and
Thomas D. Eliot filed with Chown v. Taleri, a Complaint to Abate and Enjoin Nuisance (on file with
Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, American Social Hygiene Association
(hereinafter "ASHA"), Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 2: Injunction and Abatement, Cases,
1912-17); Letter from Bascom Johnson to G.S. Cole (July 6, 1920) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files,
Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota); Neil Larry Shumsky, Tacit Acceptance: Respectable Americans and Segregated
Prostitution, 1870-1910, 19 1. SOC. HIsT 665, 666 (1986); Neil Larry Shumsky & Larry M. Springer,
San Francisco's Zone of Prostitution, 1880-1934, 7 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 71, 73-82 (1981).
2. In its 1915 masthead, the ASHA identified Thomas D. Eliot as "Field Secretary" for the
ASHA's "Western States Division." Eliot had his offices in the Phelan Building in San Francisco. See
Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, 2 (1915) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3,
Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota).
3. The Barbary Coast was a thirty-five block region bounded by Stockton, Kearny, Broadway,
and Market streets. In the early 1870s, Col. Albert S. Evans provided this memorable description of
the area: "Every city on earth has its special sink of vice, crime and degradation, its running ulcer or
moral cancer.... Speak of the deeper depth, the lower hell, the maelstrom of vice and iniquity from
whence those who once fairly enter escape no more forever - and [San Franciscans] will point
triumphantly to the Barbary Coast, strewn end to end with the wrecks of humanity, and challenge you
to match it anywhere outside the lake of fire and brimstone." ALBERT S. EVANS, A LA CALIFORNIA:
1
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District.4 Walking along Broadway, he turned left onto Keamey. The
sounds and smells of Chinatown filled the heavy night air. As he took a
right onto Pacific Street, he was now in the heart of the Barbary Coast.5
Throngs of people walked up and down the streets enjoying the district's
combustible mixture of sex and other entertainments. Brothels, hot-sheet
hotels and gambling dens were intertwined with semi-respectable dance
halls, theaters, cabarets and restaurants. As Johnson turned down onto the
single block of Beckett Street, passers-by must have assumed that he was
either another restless young man looking for sexual pleasure or one of the
many middle-class voyeurs who came to the Barbary Coast looking for
cheap, visual thrills.
Near the comer of Beckett and Jackson Streets, Johnson stopped in front
of the building. A few hours earlier Eliot had been in this same spot
staring at a woman in a sleeveless dress, cut very low at the neck and
reaching only to her knees. Eliot had told him how the young woman had
called out to him, "Won't you stay dearie? I'll kiss the baby nice. Love
you up nice." She had motioned to him in "flagrant, indecent gestures,"
the streetlights illuminating her painted eyes and cheeks. "What's your
price?" Eliot had asked. "One dollar." "Are there others in the house?"
She had responded indignantly, "How many do you want; ain't I good
enough?" He hadn't answered her. He had just turned away and headed
back to his apartment at 1417B Arch Street in Berkeley.
Now Johnson was staring at two women dressed in a similarly
provocative manner. Both had painted cheeks and darkened eyes. Maybe
one of them had been the woman who had propositioned Eliot. As he
stood there looking at them, they beckoned him: "Come on in dearie. Take
one of us. Will give you a fine time. Do it two ways for a dollar." Like
Eliot before him, Johnson spumed their invitations and began the long,
cold trip back to Berkeley. The two women thought nothing of Johnson or
Eliot. Lots of middle-class people came to the Barbary Coast. Some were
customers, some simply came to gawk at the steamy underside of San
Francisco.
SKETCH OF LIFE IN THE GOLDEN STATE ch. 12 (San Francisco, A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1873), available at
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist6/evans.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
4. Gunther Barth has argued that the conjunction of Chinatowns with red-light districts functioned
as "safety valves of the control system." Within these parts of town, Chinese immigrants were
"liberated ... briefly from the shackles of work which debt bondage placed on their shoulders ...
[T]he visit to a gambling hall, a brothel, or an opium den added precious hours of freedom" to the
lives of indentured immigrants. "In Chinese California they saw themselves momentarily admitted to
that life of leisure which in part had motivated them to leave their native village in search of a fortune
overseas." GUNTHER BARTH, BITTER STRENGTH: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES
109-10, 126-29 (1964).
5. During the years 1908-10, there were approximately forty resorts, cabarets and saloons in a
three block area of Pacific Street. Most of these establishments were driven out of business following
enactment of the California Red Light Abatement Act of 1914. Jesse B. Cook Papers, Barbary Coast
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Sacramento, September 15, 1917 6
Edwin E. Grant, S. C. Barker and R. Estrada were standing on the 200
block of L Street, less than a quarter of a mile from the riverfront. As they
entered the Art Dance Hall the air turned hot and smoky. When their eyes
adjusted to the light, they could see thirty to forty women and a large
crowd of men. Out of the crowd, two women approached the party. Their
names were Ethel and Rose. They asked the men if they wanted liquor.
They asked them if wanted sex. It would only cost a dollar and they could
have sex right on the premises - in any one of the many curtained booths
that lined the Dance Hall.
Later that evening May Dixon approached the men. The scene at the
Dance Hall was winding down and she asked them if they wanted to come
home with her. Her apartment at 417 K Street was just a few blocks
away and they could have sex there for a few dollars.
Bascom Johnson, Thomas Eliot, Edwin Grant, S.C. Barker, and R.
Estrada were all foot soldiers in a ground war against America's red-light
districts - a war largely fought by private individuals and Progressive
reform organizations. Their mission was to gather information about
suspected places of prostitution. Johnson alone boasted that his efforts in
California "brought some fifteen or twenty separate suits against houses of
prostitution in the old Barbary coast red-light district."7 This was not a war
against the prostitute, however, but a war against the property owner.
Ultimately, the fruits of this investigatory work would be used to gain
control over the physical structures in which the women plied their trade.
Parcel by parcel, their efforts contributed to the extinguishing of red lights
throughout America.
Before 1909 most American cities, including many small ones, had red-
light districts. For every (in)famous red-light district such as San
Francisco's Barbary Coast, or New Orleans' Storyville, there were dozens
of local red-light districts in places such as Sioux City, Iowa,8 Eau Claire,
Wisconsin, 9 Waco, Texas' ° and East Grand Forks, Minnesota."' Although
6. Facts together with probable inferences taken from the Affidavit of Edwin E. Grant filed with
People v. Laine, 182 P. 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919) (commonly know as the "Art Dance Hall Case")
(ASHA, Legal and Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court
Cases, 1918-22, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota). The State Law
Enforcement League based in San Francisco gathered the evidence in the case.
7. Letter from Bascom Johnson to G.S. Cole, supra note 1.
8. William L. Hewitt, Wicked Traffic in Girls: Prostitution and Reform in Sioux City, 1885-1910,
51 ANNALS OF IOWA 123 (1991).
9. Bonnie Ripp-Shucha, "This Naughty, Naughty City": Prostitution in Eau Claire from the
Frontier to the Progressive Era, 81 WIS. MAG. OF HIST. 30 (1997).
10. David C. Humphrey, Prostitution in Texas: From the 1830s to the 1960s, 33 E. TEX. HIST. J.
27 (1995).




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
laws against prostitution, solicitation and pandering existed, "segregated"
red-light districts continued to function with the tacit consent of the police
and public. Women who confined their activities to these areas could
generally practice their trade free of police interference. Beginning in
1909, however, red-light districts were confronted with a new weapon in
the war against prostitution: the "Red Light Abatement" or "Injunction
and Abatement" law. The emergence of the Red Light Abatement laws in
the Progressive era depended on two parallel historical developments -
one cultural, the other legal.
Interest in and support for the new laws was inseparable from a
discursive reconceptualization of the prostitute within American society.
In the late nineteenth century, the prostitute was conceived of primarily as
a "fallen woman" - perhaps deserving of sympathy, but ultimately
responsible for her position in life on account of her lax morals. Where the
fallen woman lived - in the segregated vice district - demarcated both a
literal and cultural boundary line between respectability and degeneracy."
In the early twentieth century, however, the prostitute was reconceived as
a "white slave" - an innocent, agency-less, pre-sexual (country) girl who
had been tricked into a life of prostitution by urban panders. The
reconceptualization of the prostitute from "fallen woman" to "white slave"
destabilized the category of the prostitute, causing the "respectable"
segments of society both to identify with the white slave and to feel
obliged to come to her rescue.13
The connection between the reconceptualization of the prostitute and the
Red Light Abatement laws vividly illustrates how the destabilization of a
boundary-defining classification can alter the rationale for segregated
residential patterns.1 4 In the case of the red-light district, this cross-
boundary identification undermined the district's value as a physical and
figurative boundary-line separating degeneracy from middle class
1915, 51 MINN. HIST. 290 (1989).
12. Critical race feminists and other legal scholars have observed that the prostitute has
historically performed a boundary creating function against which the middle class, especially middle
class women, could define their own respectability and worthiness. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS,
BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT
174-76 (1990); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1220, 1272, 1277-78 (1999).
13. It is important to note that this reconceptualization did not challenge the
degeneracy/respectability dichotomy or disrupt the social structures of domination that have
historically been associated with society's conception of the prostitute. See Balos & Fellows, supra
note 12, at 1269-90. Instead, the reconceptualization of some prostitutes as white slaves merely
allowed a set of women that society had previously characterized as "unworthy" to be considered
'worthy."
14. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration:
Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1595 (1995) (arguing
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respectability. 15 In fact, conceptions of respectability became increasingly
dependent on the elimination of this boundary-line - through the
destruction of the red-light districts - in order to rescue the trapped white
slave.
The Red Light Abatement laws began in Iowa and spread to forty-one
states by 1919. Doctrinally, the Red Light Abatement laws represented the
culmination of a movement that had begun a generation earlier in Kansas
and Iowa with the Liquor Abatement laws. Like their liquor law
predecessors, the Red Light Abatement laws expanded statutorily who had
standing to bring public nuisance actions by eliminating the common law
requirement that a private individual show "special injury."' 6 This
dissemination of standing to the general public created a use-specific
"anticommons" 1 7 such that every citizen within a broadly defined
jurisdictional area was given the right to exclude prostitution from a
property through public nuisance law. In little more than a decade, these
laws had permanently transformed the landscape of urban America in
what could be considered the most successful use of public nuisance law
in American history. By the early 1920s most of America's red-light
districts were gone. By 1952, Galveston, Texas had the distinction of
possessing the only red-light district in America. "8
The communitarian blending of public and private rights in the Red
Light Abatement laws provides a counter narrative to the sharp
public/private distinction often presumed to have existed in the Lochner 9
era. In contrast to the substantive due process concern of defining and
maintaining the boundary line between a constitutionally protected sphere
of personal liberty and the police power, the Red Light Abatement laws
dissolved this boundary line by intermingling public and private rights.
Progressives used public nuisance law to place community needs and
norms over the individual rights of property owners such that public harms
became private harms, injuries to the community became injuries to the
individual, and each citizen became his own attorney-general.
15. Although not entirely analogous, the connection between the destabilization of the prostitute
and the elimination of the segregated vice districts lends some support to arguments put forth by
critical race theorists that the destabilization of racial categories is the key to ending racial segregation.
See id. at 1644-45, 1649-50.
16. Under traditional common law nuisance doctrines, an individual could enjoin a public
nuisance in equity only if he had suffered special damages different from those suffered by him in
common with the public. If not, actions against public nuisances could be brought only by public
officials, such as the attorney-general, in a criminal action. See Section I.A(l)-(2), infra.
17. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 622 (1998) (observing that where multiple owners are given a
right to exclude, a resource is prone to underuse). In the case of the Red Light Abatement laws, the
right to exclude was limited to a particular use of the property.
18. Bascom Johnson, Good Laws ... Good Tools: Injunctions and Abatements versus Houses of
Prostitution, 38 J. SOC. HYGIENE 204, 210 (1952).
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Despite the enduring impact that these laws had on the urban fabric of
America's cities, the Progressive era transformations in public nuisance
law have been largely ignored in discussions of property law and land use
regulation. With the exception of a single book, 2 there has been no
sustained discussion of the Red Light Abatement movement (or the Liquor
Abatement movement) since the Progressive era. The history of the Red
Light Abatement movement that follows is not a "lawyer's history": it is
not a story about the past strung together to serve an argument about the
present.21 Rather, it is a project of historical restoration. 22 Part I details the
transformation of public nuisance law in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century and the impact of liquor legislation in laying the legal
groundwork for the Red Light Abatement laws a generation later. Part II
examines how the fate of America's red-light districts was inextricably
connected to the social construction of the prostitute. Part III details how
the war against the red-light district operated on two different levels.23 At
the local level, groups such as Chicago's Committee of Fifteen acted as
private police forces in a block-by-block ground war against the
bawdyhouse. By contrast, the American Social Hygiene Association
("ASHA") acted as a national legal clearing house for constitutional
challenges to the Red Light Abatement laws, tracked state legislation,
promoted model laws, and supplied investigators for enforcement of the
laws.
Some will find in this examination of the Red Light Abatement laws an
optimistic story of how nuisance law can be used to enforce community
rights and how the destabilization of boundary-defining classifications can
radically alter the psychological and cultural barriers that lead to
residential segregation. Others, by contrast, will find a cautionary tale
20. The one legal historian who has tackled the subject is Thomas C. Mackey. In the third chapter
of RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION, DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE
DISTRICTS, 1870-1917 (1987), Mackey provides a doctrinal analysis of the Red Light Abatement laws
and their relationship to the common law of public nuisance. As the first work on the subject, Mackey
does an admirable job of charting changes in prostitution laws during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. Mackey's focus on prostitution, however, caused him to miss the importance of
liquor legislation in the development of the Red Light Abatement laws. See discussion infra Part I.C.
21. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1194 (1999).
22. Historians of prostitution and the Progressive era have tended to subsume the study of the Red
Light Abatement laws within a broader Progressive assault on prostitution, which included laws
against "white slavery," venereal disease and street prostitution. See, e.g., DAVID J. PIVAR, PURITY
AND HYGIENE: WOMEN, PROSTITUTION, AND THE "AMERICAN PLAN," 1900-1930 (2002); TIMOTHY J.
GILFOYLE, CITY OF EROS: NEW YORK CITY, PROSTITUTION, AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SEX,
1790-1920 (1992); BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND
THE AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION (1987); RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN
AMERICA, 1900-1918 (1982); MARK THOMAS CONNELLY, THE RESPONSE TO PROSTITUTION IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA (1980). Analytically, this conflation is useful to see the breadth of Progressive
reforms in the area of commercialized sex. Nevertheless, this approach also obscures some of the
distinctive legal transformations wrought by the Red Light Abatement laws.
23. A significant amount of this section is based on previously unexamined archival materials
from the Social Welfare History Archives at the University of Minnesota and the Progressive era
collections at Yale University.
[Vol. 16:123
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about the use of civil remedies to accomplish criminal objectives 24 and the
role that hysteria can play in shaping legal change. Whatever conclusions
one draws, the overarching themes of this story - the relationship between
social control, public and private rights, and land use regulation - remain
salient in twenty-first century American society.
1. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
The legal groundwork for the Red Light Abatement laws was paved by
the struggle against the other great moral vice of the Progressive era:
alcohol. In the thirty years prior to the first Red Light Abatement law,
nuisance law underwent a series of transformations that increasingly
blurred the distinction between public and private nuisances. These
transformations in nuisance doctrine - mostly statutorily driven - added a
new level of incoherence to what had already been described as a
"'wilderness' of law."25 Thus, while treatise writers could still point to
something called "the common law of nuisance," much of what was done
under nuisance law had little to do with the common law. As discussed in
Parts II and III, Progressive reformers would seize upon this erosion of
common law principles to transform public nuisance law into a powerful
legal weapon for controlling public and private property.
A. The Common Law of Nuisance
The nineteenth and early twentieth century treatises present the common
law of nuisance as a coherent and structured doctrine - perhaps too
coherent. As discussed more below, the presentation of nuisance law in
the treatises is probably best understood as an idealized form rather than
an accurate representation of legal reality. Yet, it is important to delineate
the contours of this idealized form in order to understand the debates
surrounding the transformation of public nuisance law in this period.
(1) Definitions
Doctrinally, the common law distinction between public and private
nuisances is straightforward. According to the late nineteenth-century
treatise writer Horace Wood, private nuisances were "injuries that result
from the violation of private rights, and produce damages to but one or a
few persons, so that it cannot be said to be public. 26 In general, private
nuisance actions were addressed in equity courts before the chancellor.
24. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325 (1991).
25. 1 HORACE WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES, at iii (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney 1893).
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Public nuisances were defined as those that "result from the violation of
public rights, and, producing no special injury to one more than another of
the people, may be said to have a common effect, and to produce common
damage., 27 A public nuisance was considered an indictable offense "at
law" whose redress must be pursued by criminal prosecution on behalf of
the public.2" Public nuisance actions, therefore, entitled defendants to trial
by jury. Due to the criminal nature of public nuisances, it was generally
held that a "private person may not, of his own motion, abate a strictly
public nuisance under any circumstances. 29 This criminal/civil distinction
between public and private nuisances could be traced to the distinct
origins of the two actions. 30 Public nuisance was a criminal action to halt
and punish depredations against public rights and the king's peace.3'
Private nuisance, by contrast, arose from the assize of nuisance, a2 which
barred interference with enjoyment of property. Thus, private nuisance
complemented the assize of novel disseisin,3 3 which put rightful owners in
the possession of their property.3
(2) The "Special Injury" Rule
Until the sixteenth century, common law courts maintained a clear
distinction between public and private nuisance actions. Individuals who
attempted to bring private actions for public nuisances were rejected on
the ground that the public nuisance was a crime and no person could have
a remedy in respect of it.35 Had the common law courts managed to
maintain this distinction, the history of nuisance law would have been far
simpler. However, in 1536, the line separating the two causes of action
was breached when it was held in an anonymous case that a private citizen
could bring an action on the case for public nuisance where he could show
27. Id. § 14, at 34.
28. JOSEPH JOYCE & HOWARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING NUISANCES WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS APPLICATION TO MODERN CONDITIONS AND COVERING THE ENTIRE
LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE NUISANCES § 14, at 22 (1906); 2 HORACE WOOD, THE LAW
OF NUISANCES § 674, at 881 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney 1893).
29. 2 WOOD, supra note 8, § 732, at 941. See also id., § 734, at 947 ("No individual, under any
circumstances, is justified in abating a purely public injury, and should he attempt the experiment, he
would find himself involved in serious consequences.").
30. See generally Janet Loengard, The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law,
37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1978). See also Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89,97 n.45 (1998).
31. JR. Spencer, Public Nuisance -A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55,58 (1989).
32. A write of assize directing a sheriff to summon a jury to view the nuisance premises and do
justice. A successful plaintiff was entitled to abate the nuisance and recover damages. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 118 (7th ed. 1999).
33. A writ of assize for a tenant who disseised of land and tenements. Id.
34. Loengard, supra note 30, at 144, 158-59.
35. See F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q REv. 480, 483 (1949); William
Prosser, Private Actions for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 997 (1966);
[Vol. 16:123
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that he had suffered "greater hurt or inconvenience than any other man.
' '16
Subsequent generations of treatise writers would refer to this limitation
on private public nuisance actions as the "special injury" rule:
[A]n individual, in order to be entitled to a recovery from injuries
sustained from a public nuisance, must make out a clear case of
special damages to himself, apart from the rest of the public, and of a
different character, so that they cannot fairly be said to be a part of
the common injury resulting therefrom... . It is not enough that he
has sustained more damage than another; it must be of a different
character, special, and apart from that which the public in general
sustain, and not such as is common to every person who exercises the
right that is injured.37
When applied to prostitution houses, the special injury rule generally
limited who could bring a nuisance action to those adjacent to the
offending structure.38 Otherwise, the action would have to be brought by
indictment as public nuisance.
39
The need for the special injury requirement was viewed as more than
mere functionalism. The fusion of the two causes of action in the 1536
case had liberated private nuisance law from its original conception as a
tort to the plaintiff's enjoyment of his property.4" The special injury rule
for public nuisances was thought to preserve the line between public and
private rights and act as a safeguard against excessive private
36. Newark, supra note 35, at 483 (quoting Fitzherbert, J.). Newark contends that this
anonymous case set nuisance "on the wrong track" by moving nuisance actions into the realm of
personal injuries. Id.
37. 2 WOOD, supra note 8, § 646, at 855. See also JOYCE & JOYCE, supra note 8, § 14, at 22
("[T]hat which is a public nuisance, and which annoys the public generally or invades its rights,
constitutes a private nuisance where an individual, or class of individuals, sustains as such, a special
injury as distinguished from that sustained by the public, and redress in such case exists by way of
public remedy. If the injury is common to the public and special to none redress must be by criminal
prosecution in behalf of the public.").
38. See, e.g., Crawford v. Tyrrell, 28 N.E. 514, 515 (N.Y. 1891) (affirming plaintiff's right to
bring a public nuisance action against a bawdyhouse on account of the plaintiffs special injury from
"the indecent conduct of the occupants of the defendant's house, and the noise thereupon, inasmuch as
they rendered the plaintiff's house unfit for comfortable or respectable occupation ... ").
39. 2 WOOD, supra note 28, § 672, at 880 ("Bawdy house, establishment of, when actionable. -
In the case of a bawdy house, it is a public nuisance per se wherever located, and generally, only a
proper subject of indictment, yet cases may arise where even that becomes also a private nuisance as
to some. As, if it is kept upon a street adjoining the tenements of another, and by reason thereof his
tenants leave, and his property is greatly depreciated in value, does he not sustain a special damage, so
particular to himself and different from that sustained by the rest of the public as fairly entitles him to
an action for damages?"); Crawford v. Tyrrell, 28 N.E. at 515 ("The mere fact of a business being
carried on which may be shown to be immoral, and, therefore, prejudicial to the character of the
neighborhood, fumishes of itself no ground for equitable interference at the suit of a private person;
and, though the use of property may be unlawful or unreasonable, unless special damage can be
shown, a neighboring property owner cannot base thereupon any private right of action. It is for the
public authorities, acting in the common interest, to interfere for the suppression of the common
nuisance.").
40. Newark, supra note 35, at 483.
9
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prosecutions. 41 The treatise writers feared that if this line was transgressed,
then there would be no meaningful line between public and private law.
The "oasis of private rights"42 so carefully protected by classical legal
jurisprudence would become subject to the rule of the mob:
Such a power in the hands of any person who saw fit to exercise it,
would be destructive of the best interests of society, and would lay
open a large part of our manufacturing and business interests to the
mere caprice of the reckless and unprincipled elements that form a
part of every community, and instead of making the law a shield
against wrong and oppression would convert it into a sword with
which to strike down any interest that chance to fall under the ban of
any person's displeasure.
4 3
(3) Injury to Property/Injury to Persons Distinction
Another principle of the common law of public nuisance was that
injunctions would only be granted on the ground of injury to property, and
not on the ground of injury to persons.44 As a result, moral offenses such
as gambling and violations of Sunday laws were considered outside the
scope of equity jurisdiction.45 Maintaining this distinction, however,
sometimes required some rather tortured logic. For example, in the
English case of Crowder v. Tinkler,46 an injunction was granted to restrain
the erection of a coming house to be used in connection with certain
powder ills, which stood within two hundred feet of a paper mill occupied
by the complainants. Lord Eldon was careful to point out that he granted
41. In the United States, public prosecutions began to replace the system of private prosecutions
long before the colonies gained their independence. By the late seventeenth century, state prosecutors
were established in some colonies and by the end of the eighteenth century, most states had committed
to the concept of public prosecutions. Nevertheless, because of deficiencies in the office of public
prosecutor, American citizens continued to prosecute private criminal actions in many locales during
the nineteenth century. For example, a study of Philadelphia during this period revealed that many
cases were privately prosecuted. See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880 (1989); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REv. 511, 517-18 (1994); Robert M. Ireland,
Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 43, 43 (1995); Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt:
Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q 85, 102-03 (1992); Sklansky, supra note
21,at 1205-11.
42. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 11 (1992).
43. 2 WOOD, supra note 28, § 740, at 966-67.
44. JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 289, at 587-88 (1901) ("[I]n
cases of private nuisance the injury is to individual property, and in cases of public nuisance the injury
is to the property of mankind." ). See also 2 WOOD, supra note 28, § 789, at 1157 (noting that equity
will not issue an injunction unless the complainant demonstrates "actual injury to the property, or its
comfortable enjoyment .... ").
45. 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES; SUPPLEMENT TO
POMEROY'S EQUITABLE JURISPRUDENCE § 476, at 791-92 (1905).
46. 19 Ves. Jun. 618, 34 E.R. 645 (1816).
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the injunction only on the ground of injury to property, although it was
shown that if the coming mill should explode, great loss of life would
probably ensure among the occupants of the paper mill.47
(4) "Courts of equity have no jurisdiction in matters of crime" 4
Since the abolition of Star Chamber in 1641, courts of equity have not
exercised criminal jurisdiction."0 In the United States, the abolition of
criminal equity was made permanent in the Sixth Amendment, which
entitles the accused in criminal prosecutions to a trial by jury.51 The
47. Seymour D. Thompson, Injunction Against Criminal Acts, 18 AM. L. REv. 599, 605 (1884)
(citing Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. Jun. 618, 34 E.R. 645 (1816)).
48. Id. at 599. There was, however, a minor exception for infants. See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst.
402, 413, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818) (Lord Eldon: "I have no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of
crime, excepting, of course, such cases as belong to the protection of infants, where a dealing with an
infant may amount to a crime... ").
49. Prior to 1641, equity had exercised criminal jurisdiction in the Court of Star Chamber. The
rules of procedure used in the Court of Star Chamber were the same as those used in the Court of
Chancery - defendants were brought to court by a writ of subpoena, the Court was empowered to
examine them, and facts were ascertained by the examination of the accused and witnesses,
Proceedings were tried summarily and there was no need for a grand jury or jury trial. The Court of
Star Chamber was initially popular, but by the seventeenth century it had become an increasingly
unpopular enforcer of state proclamations and was viewed as an engine of tyranny in the hands of the
Stuart monarchy. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 137 (3d ed. 1990);
A.K.R. KIRALFY, POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 150-
51 (4th ed. 1958); SELECT CASES IN THE COUNCIL OF HENRY VII, at xlix-cxlviii, esp- liii (C.G. Bayne
ed., 1958) (Selden Society Series vol. 75); James T. Barry IIl, Comment, The Council of Revision and
the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 238 (1989).
In historical memory, the Star Chamber was vilified for its use of inflictive bodily punishments -
branding of foreheads, nose slitting, ear severing, and its lack of due process protections - ex parte
meetings, secret proceedings, lack of recording, and summary adjudication. See Brandreth v. Lance, 8
Paige 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch- 1839); BAKER, supra, at 137; COLIN RHYS LOVELL, ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 275 (1962). Echoes of these criticisms can be heard in cases
stretching over the last century. See, e.g., E. Griffith Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362, 364 (App.
D.C. 1933); Parker v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300, 308-09 (D.C. Cal. 1951); State v. Jenkins, 950 P.2d
1138. 1145-46 (Kan. 1997) (characterizing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), as a "star chamber
case"); Sasinoski v. Cannon, 696 A.2d 267, 269 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1997); Karras v. Gannon, 345
N.W.2d 854, 859-60 (S.D. 1984) (Henderson, J-, concurring); Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc.,
248 A.2d 45, 47 (Pa. 1968); Wheaton v. Slattery, 88 N.Y.S. 1074, 1075 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904). For all
of the Star Chamber's faults, these due process criticisms may be unwarranted. Max Radin has argued
that "[t]he common association of the Star Chamber procedure with secrecy and denial of a hearing to
the accused has no justification whatsoever," and that the court conducted its business in English at a
time when the law courts still used Latin. MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 71 (1936). See also KIRALFY, supra, at 151 ("Another feature of the Star Chamber ... was
that it sat in public .... ").
50. See Shuman v. Gilbert, 118 N.E. 254, 227 (Mass. 1918) ("It is the general rule that the
prosecution and punishment of crimes will not be restrained by a court of chancery."); F.W.
MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 19 (1947) ("Since the destruction of the Star Chamber
we have had no criminal equity. The Court of Chancery kept very clear of the province of crime, and
since the province of crime and tort overlap, it kept very clear of large portions of the province of
tort."). The rule was more recently stated in West Allis Mem 'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 936,
939 (E.D. Wis. 1987) ("One of the principles of our jurisprudence is that 'equity will not enjoin a
crime."'); HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, ESSAYS IN EQUITY 109 (1934) (same); Thompson, supra
note 47, at 599 (1884) (same).
51. See United States v. Lot 29, Block 16, Highland Place, City of Omaha, Neb., 296 F. 729, 736
11
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practical impact of the abolition of criminal equity meant that as long as
the remedy at law was considered adequate to address the plaintiffs
injury, equity would not interfere. "A court of equity will not lend its aid
for the prevention of wrongs or the protection of rights by the granting of
an injunction, if the party aggrieved has a full, complete and adequate
remedy at law."52 When confronted with attempts to revive criminal
equity, courts could rely upon a well-developed line of argumentation that
had its origins in the historical experience with the Court of Star Chamber:
The objections to 'criminal equity' are that it deprives the defendant
of his jury trial; that it substitutes for the definite penalties fixed by
the Legislature whatever punishment for contempt a particular judge
may see fit to exact; that it is often no more than an attempt to
overcome by circumvention the supposed shortcomings of jurors; and
that it may result, or induce the public to believe that it results, in the
arbitrary exercise of power and in 'government by injunction.'
5 3
For a typical public nuisance action, a criminal trial would be
considered adequate to address the public wrongs inflicted on the
community. Moreover, defendants in such actions could argue that they
were entitled to a trial by jury. It was only in the case of special injury -
where the injury to the plaintiff was so particularized that equity would
take jurisdiction over a public nuisance claim. Thus, from the perspective
of the treatise writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
equity courts could grant injunctive relief, but only in civil matters
involving the protection of private property rights.
B. Erosion of Common Law Principles
Even before the late nineteenth-century transformations in public
nuisance doctrine, there were indications that the actual practice in equity
courts did not adhere to the common law model. In 1884, Seymour D.
Thompson 4 published an article in the American Law Review, arguably
(D. Neb. 1924) ("But there is reason to believe that the simple declaration, 'All crimes shall be tried
by jury,' was incorporated in the Constitution of the United States with a very determined purpose to
absolutely prevent any court of criminal jurisdiction like that of the Star Chamber Court ever coming
into existence in this country.").
52. EATON, supra note 44, at 567 (1901). See also 2 WOOD, supra note 28, § 788, at 1150-51. The
rule was more recently stated in Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 673 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991)
("Although law and equity have been merged in most jurisdictions, the adequate remedy rule
continues to be cited as a ground for denying injunctive relief....").
53. Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance Co., 38 N.E. 640, 643 (Mass. 1941) (refusing to grant an
injunction against defendants for violating Massachusetts interest laws). See also Kwass v. Kersey, 81
S.E.2d 237, 242 (W. Va. 1954) ("An injunction will not lie for the prevention of a crime or illegal or
immoral act merely because of its illegality. One reason for the noninterference in such case is the
fundamental want ofjurisdiction; another is the existence of an adequate remedy at law.").
54. Thompson was joint editor of the American Law Review after its merger with the Southern
Law Review in 1883. Thompson was also the author of several leading texts, including the Law of
Negligence and a treatise on the law of civil and criminal trials. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF
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the most influential legal periodical of the nineteenth century,55 exposing
several instances where theories of equitable jurisdiction diverged from
actual practice. First, Thompson observed that the priority distinction
between remedies at law and remedies at equity was frequently
breached. 6 In particular, Thompson cited public nuisances as a case where
equity took jurisdiction even though the injury was criminal and there was
a clear remedy at law.57 The early nineteenth-century treatise writer and
Supreme Court Justice,58 Joseph Story, provided a historical imprimatur
for this breach of the criminal equity prohibition: "In regard to public
nuisances the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity seems to be of a very
ancient date, and has been distinctly traced back to the reign of Queen
Elizabeth. The jurisdiction is applicable not only to public nuisances,
strictly so called, but also to purprestures upon public rights and
property."59
Thompson next took aim at the common law presumption that equity
courts only granted injunctive relief for injuries to property, not injuries to
persons. In some cases Thompson noted that this general rule had been
AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 191,229 n.48 (1990).
55. THOMAS A. WOXLAND & PATTI J. OGDEN, LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN LEGAL PUBLISHING 48
(1989). The American Law Review's editorial staff was dominated by some of the leading legal
luminaries of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Arthur G.
Sedgwick, John C. Gray, and John C. Ropes. The latter two men were described as possessing "an
enviable reputation for their ability and discriminating taste." American Law Periodicals, 2 ALB. L.J.
445,449 (1870). See also SURRENCY, supra note 54, at 192.
56. Thompson, supra note 47, at 603-04 ("There are really many cases in which jurisdiction of a
court of equity to protect property or other rights by injunction is not ousted by the fact that the thing
complained of incidentally involves the commission of a crime.").
57. Id. at 604. By the second quarter of the twentieth century, American courts had come to
recognize that there was a general "nuisance" exception to the general rule that "equity will not enjoin
a crime." See United States v. Lot 29, Block 16, 296 F.2d at 737 ("The court of equity may, in certain
cases, abate existing nuisances, even though the nuisance is made up of criminal acts .. ");
Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance Co., 38 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Mass. 1941) ("[T]he trend is hostile to
the development of a 'criminal equity' in cases involving criminal acts not amounting to a true public
nuisance .. "). For a more recent statement of the public nuisance exception, see SEC v. Carriba Air,
Inc., 681 F.2d 1318 (11'h Cir. 1982) (noting that there were exceptions to the prohibition against
criminal equity established during the eighteenth century for public nuisances that were also crimes),
58. He was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1811. For a brief biography of Story, see
SURRENCY, supra note 54, at 142-45.
59. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1248, at 596 (14th ed. 1918).
Story's history of nuisance law was not universally accepted. In an article focused on restoring the
traditional common law of nuisance, Henry Schofield contended that Story's claim was based on three
obscure cases, two of which were allegedly in error and the other was dictum. Schofield concluded,
"There is little in the equity reports on the subject of suits by the attorney general to abate and enjoin
public nuisances before Lord Eldon became chancellor in 1801." Henry Schofield, Equity Jurisdiction
to Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. REv. 19, 20-21 (1914). See also
Arthur C. Rounds, Injunctions Against Liquor Nuisances, 9 HARV. L. REv. 521, 523-25 (1895-96)
(reaching the same conclusion as Schofield and concluding, "It seems then to be sufficiently evident
that in the cases of public nuisances there is no exception to the general rule that equity has
jurisdiction only in civil cases, and that its injunction will issue only to prevent or remedy injuries of a
civil nature to property.").
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strenuously upheld.6' In other cases, however, equity's claim of protecting
property rights was little more than an overstrained "fiction.- 6 Thompson
found the "injury to property/injury to persons" distinction to be
particularly confused in the area of public nuisances.62 One reason for the
confusion was that equity did not always limit itself to hearing cases
involving injuries to property. Equity would also hear nuisance cases
involving deprivation of health and comfort. Thus, when equity enjoined a
factory for producing a noxious stench it could cite discomfort to
individuals as grounds for the injunctive relief 63 But, when equity did not
wish to enjoin a dangerous factory that might explode and kill its
neighbors, the chancellor could employ the "injury to property/injury to
persons" distinction as grounds for refusing injunctive relief.6 Citing a
lack of "adherence to uniform principles,"65 Thompson noted that the
"injury to property/injury to persons" distinction had been "broken into so
many important particulars as to leave scarcely any appearance of logic or
symmetry."66 As evidence for this assertion, Thompson could point to the
logical inconsistency of equity granting injunctive relief for stenches and
revolutions, but not explosions or conflagrations.
67
Another point of doctrinal confusion concerned the powers of
individuals to abate a public nuisance. To the dismay of treatise writers
68
and legal scholars,69 some courts had begun to argue that private
individuals could abate a public nuisance even if they had not suffered
special injury.70 Although legal scholars such as G. R. Eldridge would
deride these court opinions as "reckless statements, and loose
expressions,' the refusal of these ideas to wither in the face of
established doctrine revealed an underlying frustration with the common
law's public-private distinction.
The shaky foundations of the common law of public nuisance were
60. Thompson, supra note 47, at 605 (citing the case of Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. Jun. 618, 34
E.R. 645 (1816), where Lord Eldon was careful to point out that he granted the injunction only on the
ground of injury to property, although it was established that if the coming mill exploded, the
occupants of the paper mill would likely be killed).
61. Id. at 607.
62. Id. at 605-08.
63. Id. at 608.
64. Id. at 608.
65. Id. at 608.
66. Id- at 605.
67. Thompson, supra note 47, at 608. The former were characterized as injuries to property or
deprivations of health whereas the latter were considered injuries to persons.
68. 2 WOOD, supra note 28, § 732, at 941.
69- G.R. Eldridge, Abatement of Nuisances, 19 CENT. L.J. 42 (1884).
70. Gunter v. Geary, I Cal. 462 (1851), was the case most widely cited for the proposition that
any person could abate a public nuisance. See also Eldridge, supra note 69, at 43 n. 12 (providing a list
of additional cases).
71. Id. at 43.
[Vol. 16:123
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Hum nities, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol16/iss1/5
Hennigan
rattled even further by a wave of statutory legislation in the late nineteenth
century. Various interest groups exploited the ambiguities and
inconsistencies in public nuisance law that Thompson had observed in
1884. By the time of the first Red Light Abatement law in 1909, public
nuisance law had been stretched to include private actions and the scope
of injunctive relief had expanded to encompass an increasing number of
activities. Critics would argue that these innovations had revived criminal
equity. Reformers would contend that these changes had merely removed
a common law obstacle to the assertion of a citizen's collective rights.
The capacity of state legislatures to define statutorily certain places or
property as public nuisances, even if they were not nuisances at common
law, was settled by the late 1880s. At the state level, most state courts had
long held that such statutory declarations were a proper and legitimate
exercise of the police power.72 Any constitutional questions raised by the
Fourteenth Amendment were settled in Mugler v. Kansas,73 when the
Supreme Court held that statutorily-defined public nuisances, if created to
protect against injuries to the health, morals or safety of the community,
did not violate the Constitution.74 By 1893, treatise writers had also
acknowledged that a state's power to define public nuisances statutorily
was virtually unlimited so long as the state acted to protect the health and
welfare of the community.
75
What was probably unanticipated in the 1880s was the extent to which
legislatures would use this power to define a broad range of actions as
public nuisances. In a 1918 Note entitled "Statutory Declarations of Public
Nuisances" the author lists the types of activities that had been pulled
under the ever-expanding umbrella of "public nuisance." These included
such disparate "nuisances" as uncapped artesian wells; buildings used for
opium smoking, drinking liquor or prostitution; buildings without fire
escapes; factories without safety devices; keeping hogs in a city; and
camping or planting willow trees alongside highways.76
At the same time that legislatures were expanding equitable jurisdiction
over public nuisances, equity courts were increasingly being asked to
provide injunctive relief for a wider range of nuisances. Among the most
controversial uses of injunctive power was the enjoining of labor strikes
under the premise of protecting interstate commerce.7 7 At the less
72. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 16 A. 911, 912-13 (R.I. 1889); Streeter v. People, 69 111. 595, 599-
600 (1873); Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray (Mass.) 26, 1859 WL 7246, at *5 (1859); Zumhoff v.
State, 4 Greene (Iowa) 526, 1854 WL 220, at *2-3 (1854); Our House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa) 172,
1853 WL 221, at *4 (1853).
73. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
74. Id. at 668-70.
75. 2 WOOD, supra note 28, § 733, at 944.
76. Note, Statutory Declarations of Public Nuisances, 18 COLUM. L RFv. 346,347 n.2 (1918).
77. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1910). For contemporary critiques of the use of injunctive relief
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controversial (and sometimes frivolous) end of the spectrum, equitable
jurisdiction was invoked to restrain the stealing of oysters, 78 the alienation
of a wife's affections, 9 a disturber of church meetings,8" and the
unwelcome entreaties of a persistent lover.8 1 Treatise writers also noted
the increased use of injunctions. In 1905, John Norton Pomerory, Jr.,
added a two volume supplement to his father's treatise on equity
jurisprudence to account for the growth of equitable remedies during his
lifetime.8 2 Doctrinally, these expanded uses of injunctive relief stretched
the common law principles beyond the breaking point. Could it honestly
be claimed that equity courts only exercised jurisdiction over injuries to
property or that or private individuals could not bring a general public
nuisance action? 83 Reflecting on the growth of equitable jurisdiction
during the Progressive era, one commentator would remark that equity had
been a victim of its own success: having proven itself so effective against
injuries to property, litigants naturally turned to equity courts for relief
from the social and political maladies plaguing turn-of-the-century
American society.84
C. Liquor Legislation
At the center of this transformation of public nuisance law was the war
over alcohol. Other than prostitution, no vice inflamed the hearts of social
reformers in the late nineteenth century more than alcohol. Along the way
to the Eighteenth Amendment, temperance advocates sought to bring
nuisance doctrine into the struggle against liquor. The cases upholding the
constitutionality of these laws provided the legal framework for the Red
Light Abatement laws a generation later.
Unlike the Red Light Abatement laws, which would be enacted by
almost all state legislatures, statutes declaring houses or tenements used
for liquor sale to be public nuisances were limited to a small number of
(1909); Charles Kerr, Evolution of the Injunction as an Arm of Government, 10 VA. L. REV. 444, 450
(1924); and Jackson H. Ralston, Government by Injunction, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 424 (1919-20).
78. See Jones v. Oemler, 35 S.E. 375 (Ga. 1900)
79. See Ex Porte Warfield, 50 S.W. 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899).
80. See Joseph M. Sullivan, Novel Uses of the Writ of Injunction, 64 ALB. L.J. 46,46 (1902).
81. See id.
82. See I POMEROY, supra note 45, at vii ("The two remedies of Receivers and Injunctions have
allotted to them more than half the space at my command, as due to the vast importance which they
have assumed in very recent years."). Cf 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND
EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 1349, at 2682-83 (3d ed. 1905) (providing only one paragraph on public
nuisance actions).
83. The expansion in equitable jurisdiction led one learned judge to conclude that the modem uses
of the writ bore no more resemblance to the ancient uses than the Milky Way bears to the Sun. See
George Whitelock, Development of the Injunction in the United States, 45 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 107, 107
(1912-13).
84. Kerr, supra note 77, at 450. See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919-
20: Equitable Relief of Torts, 34 HARV. L. REV. 388, 408 (1920-21) (observing that public nuisances
increasingly have only a remote relation to property rights).
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states, mostly in the Northeast and Midwest.85 Although these statutes all
varied to some extent, they generally contained the following elements:
(1) a statement declaring establishments that sell liquor to be public
nuisances; (2) a provision allowing any citizen of the county (or state) to
maintain a bill for an injunction, or authorizing the district
attorney/attorney general to file the bill; (3) a provision giving jurisdiction
to chancery to enjoin the nuisance; and in some cases, (4) a provision
giving chancery the power to abate the nuisance by closing the building,
followed by the removal and sale (or destruction) of the liquors, vessels,
and implements of the trade.86
The constitutionality of these Liquor Abatement laws was immediately
challenged in both state and federal courts. Defendants contended that the
Liquor Abatement laws exceeded the powers of the legislature and
deprived them of property without due process of law. Beneath the surface
of these abstract constitutional claims, defendants were objecting to what
they perceived to be transgressions of the common law of nuisance.
Defendants asserted that the Liquor Abatement laws violated the special
injury rule by permitting those not directly affected by the nuisance to
bring a public nuisance complaint, as well as by requiring that nuisance
actions be limited to invasions of property rights. They also argued that
the statutes breached the priority distinction between actions remediable at
law and actions remediable at equity. By giving equitable jurisdiction to a
matter for which there was an available remedy at law, defendants
asserted that the statutes had denied them their right to trial by jury by
transferring a criminal matter to an equity court.
At the state court level, the leading cases upholding the Liquor
Abatement laws came from two states, Kansas and Iowa. In State v.
Crawford,8 7 perhaps the earliest state Supreme Court decision dealing with
a Liquor Abatement law, the defendants' arguments met with mixed
success. The court described the case as a "novel proceeding - so novel as
85. In 1892, they numbered only eight - Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
West Virginia, Ohio, Iowa and Kansas. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS
REGULATING THE MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS § 388, at 391 n. 1 (1892). For
a survey of every state's liquor laws, see Wm. Church Osborn, Liquor Statutes in the United States, 2
HARV. L. REV. 125 (1888-89).
86. BLACK, supra note 85, § 388, at 391. In certain respects, the Liquor Abatement laws resemble
qui tam actions, although no one at the time referred to them as such. Like the qui tam, these statutes
permitted private citizens to initiate actions to redress public wrongs. Nevertheless, there were
important differences. The qui tam represented the joinder of two distinct interests, one public and the
other private. See Note, The History and Development of the Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83, 95.
The Liquor Abatement laws, by contrast, marked both the expansion of the concept of "public" and
the concomitant dissolution of the line separating public and private interests. The Liquor Abatement
laws also lacked the financial inducement of a qui tam action. Whereas the qui tam allowed private
prosecutors to share in criminal penalties or judgments of civil damages, see JERRY L. MASHAW ET
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 1115-17 (4th ed. 1998); Note, The
History and Development of the Qui Tam, supra, at 83-91, the Liquor Abatement laws only afforded
litigants the satisfaction of shutting down saloons and liquor-producing establishments.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
to startle old and experienced practitioners."88 Later in the opinion, the
court remarked that the proceeding was unique because the matter at issue
exceeded the expected boundaries of public nuisance law:
"It has been suggested, however, that this proceeding is novel, simply
for the reason that no lawyer of any eminence, or otherwise, has ever
before supposed that courts of equity had jurisdiction, under similar
circumstances, to suppress or restrain illegal drinking saloons, by the mere
remedy of injunction."89
After first determining that illegal drinking saloons had almost always
been a nuisance under Kansas law,9" the court addressed the two principle
objections to the Liquor Abatement laws: (1) that the keeping of an illegal
saloon was a criminal offense; and (2) that the statute afforded a plain and
adequate remedy - criminal prosecution of the wrong-doer creating the
public nuisance.9' As for the first objection, the court argued that
authorities were split on whether courts of equity could restrain the
commission of nuisances that are simultaneously criminal offenses.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the weight of authority and reason
argued in favor of permitting simultaneous jurisdiction for public
nuisances.92 "Indeed, the fact that public nuisances, with all their
constituent facts, are public offenses, is a very strong reason why courts of
equity should take jurisdiction of such nuisances, and suppress and enjoin
them, provided, of course, that no other adequate remedy exists." 93 As for
the second objection, the court first considered whether criminal
punishment - a remedy at law - would be sufficient to justify limiting
equitable jurisdiction. Interestingly, the court held that criminal
punishment was not necessarily a sufficient remedy.94 Injunctive relief
would be needed, the court held, if criminal punishment provided the only
alternative remedy.95 However, because the Kansas Liquor Abatement law
authorized any court (i.e., a law court) to abate and close the saloon, the
court held that the remedy at law was sufficient, and hence, equitable
jurisdiction could not be justified.96 In dicta the court explained that it was
reluctant to open the door to injunctive relief because it suspected that the
prosecution, 97 which "has a very great distrust of juries," 98 was attempting
88. Id. at 729.
89 Id at 731.
90. See id. at 731-32 ("As far back as February, 1859, the legislature of the then territory of
Kansas enacted that they were nuisances.").
91. Seeid. at735.
92. Seeid. at 735-36.
93. State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726, 736 (1882).
94. See id. at 737.
95. See id.
96. Seeid at 737-38.
97. In this case, the prosecution referred to the state of Kansas and its relator, A.H. Vance, the
county attorney of Shawnee County. See id. at 726.
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to use equitable jurisdiction to circumvent juries in prosecutions for the
suppression of liquor sales. 99
Due the particular wording of the Kansas Liquor Abatement law, the
Kansas Supreme Court was able to avoid many of the difficult questions
posed by the new law. The watershed case was decided three years later in
Iowa.' In Littleton v. Fritz1°1 the Supreme Court of Iowa eviscerated the
traditional common law doctrine of public nuisance.
In Littleton, the plaintiff brought an action under Iowa's Liquor
Abatement law to enjoin and abate the defendant's maintenance of a
saloon in Des Moines. The plaintiff in his petition to the court
acknowledged that he had suffered no special injury from the defendant's
saloon.10 2 Rather, he was bringing his bill in equity under Section 12 of the
Liquor Abatement law, which permitted any citizen of Polk County to
bring a public nuisance action on behalf of the citizenry.1"3 The defendant
not only challenged the standing of the plaintiff, but also challenged
whether a court of equity had the power to enjoin a public nuisance. As in
State v. Crawford, the defendant in this case claimed that he was entitled
to a trial by jury because the matter constituted a criminal prosecution. °4
In short order, the Littleton court dispensed with all of the defendant's
objections. In regard to the special injury rule, the court noted that there
were "many other cases which might be cited to show a very great
relaxation of the [special injury] rule."'0 5 This point hardly mattered,
however, since the court held that the legislature always retained the
power to determine who had standing in a case:
There can be no doubt that it is within the power of the legislature to
designate the person or a class of persons who may maintain actions
to restrain and abate public nuisances, and when that is done the
action is for all purposes an action instituted in behalf of the public,
the same as though brought by the attomey general or prosecutor....
The plaintiff is by law made the representative of the public in
bringing and maintaining the action. °6
As to the question of whether an equity court could enjoin a criminal
98. Id.at731.
99. See State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726, 741 (1882).
100. Thirty-five years later, the editors of the Columbia Law Review would cite Littleton as the
seminal case for the constitutionality of the Injunction and Abatement laws. See Charles S. Ascher &
James M. Wolf, Current Legislation: "Red Light Abatement Acts ", 20 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-06
(1920) ("Following Littleton v. Fritz, the courts hold that these [Red Light Abatement] laws, like the
liquor laws, merely extend the traditional jurisdiction of equity over nuisances.").
101. 22 N.W. 641 (Iowa 1885).
102. See id. at 642.
103. See id. at 642.
104. See id. at 643.
105. Id. at 644.
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action, the court again deferred to the legislature. Citing State v. Iron Cliffs
Co.,"0 7 the court held that the legislature had "unlimited" power to enlarge
equitable jurisdiction. 0 8 Nor did the court object to the legislature's
extension of equity jurisdiction to a case where no distinct property right
was involved. Similar to Seymour Thompson's analysis of the muddled
"injury to property/injury to persons" distinction, the court found this
distinction to be incoherent.'0 9
The court likewise rejected the common law priority distinction that
required actions to be kept out of equity when there was an adequate
remedy at law. In State v. Crawford, the Kansas Supreme Court had held
that this distinction was still relevant even though it might be possible to
entertain equitable jurisdiction in a public nuisance case if it could be
demonstrated that the criminal remedy was inadequate."' In Littleton, the
Iowa Supreme Court side-stepped this issue by focusing on the unique
benefits that injunctive relief provided. Unlike a criminal remedy, which
punishes past wrong-doing, the court characterized injunctive relief as
prospective, "preventive justice."' ' "It stays the arm of the wrong-doer. It
does not seek to punish him for any past violations of the law. Its purpose
is to prevent a public offense, and suppress what the law declares to be a
nuisance." '' This retrospective/prospective distinction between criminal
and equitable actions allowed the court to hold that concurrent jurisdiction
for a public nuisance case was consistent with notions of due process. A
criminal prosecution provided one type of remedy and an equitable civil
action another. The defendant's complaints about the absence of jury trial
were moot - the defendant still had the right to a jury trial if he was
criminally prosecuted. " I3
The holdings of the Littleton court are emblematic of the confused state
of public nuisance law by the mid-1880s. As Thompson had observed,'
1 4
public nuisance doctrine had become so muddled with exceptions and
conflicting cases that it was difficult to identify a coherent doctrinal
structure. The exceptions, in other words, had begun to swallow the
doctrine. Adding to this confusion was an increased legislative role in
public nuisance law. Through their police powers, legislatures were
statutorily adding categories of nuisances, expanding equitable
jurisdiction, and increasing who had standing to bring nuisance
107. 20 N.W. 493, 503 (Mich. 1844).
108. See Littleton v. Fritz, 22 N.W. 641, 644 (Iowa 1885).
109. See id. ("[A]nd we may say here that the distinction sought to be made between nuisances
where property rights are not involved is very limited, narrow, and not well defined.").
110. See State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726, 737 (1882).
111. Id. at644,
112. Seeid. at 644-45.
113. Littleton v. Fritz, 22 N.W. 641,643-44 (Iowa 1885).
114. Thompson, supra note 47, at 603-05, 608.
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complaints. These innovations went largely unchecked because of an
increasing judicial deference to legislative action in the field of nuisance
law. The Littleton court, for example, provided almost no basis for judicial
review of public nuisance legislation:
Questions of policy or expediency in legislation are for the law-making
power itself, and courts have no authority to interpose their judgment
against that of the legislature, upon the ground that the law in question
may be inexpedient, or that some other enactment would better serve to
accomplish the desired object. 1 5
The emergence of an elective judiciary 1 6 may provide a partial
explanation for why the Kansas and Iowa courts adopted such a
deferential posture towards the Liquor Abatement laws." 7 It seems
reasonable to assume that judges facing reelection pressures would have
been more willing to break with the common law nuisance doctrines in the
face of the public's hostility towards liquor establishments. The last
quarter of the nineteenth century saw an explosive growth in the
temperance movement, especially after the founding of the Women's
Christian Temperance Union in 1873."' Even though women lacked the
115. Id. at 645. The Iowa Supreme Court held that it would only declare an act of the legislature
invalid if "it is plainly, palpably, and beyond doubt repugnant to some provision of the constitution."
Id. at 646. Judicial deference was even extended to municipal laws and regulations defining public
nuisances. See Eugene McQuillin, Power of Municipality to Declare What Constitutes a Nuisance, 45
CENT. L.J. 487, 490 (1897) ("It is generally held that municipal corporations are prima facie the sole
judges on the necessity of ordinances of this character, and courts will not ordinarily review their
reasonableness when passed in pursuance of an express grant of power. .... In determining whether it
is reasonable the court should not substitute its discretion for that of the municipal legislature.").
116. Between 1846 and 1912, every state that entered the Union provided for judicial elections,
and all but two of the sixteen constitutional conventions held between 1846 and 1860 called for the
popular election of both appellate and inferior judges. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly
Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HiST.
190, 190 (1993). The movement to elect judges in partisan elections arose during the presidency of
Andrew Jackson from 1829 to 1837. Mississippi became the first state to establish an entirely elective
judiciary when it transferred the power to select all state judges from the legislature to the voters in its
1832 constitutional convention. Three states - Vermont, Georgia and Indiana - had partially elective
judiciaries prior to 1832. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 716-17 n.83 (1995); Nelson, supra, at 190. Historians have
attributed the rise of the elective judiciary to a number of factors, including Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Jacksonian democracy, participation in politics by settlers of the western
frontier, judicial rulings favorable to creditors, resistance to English common law, and judicial
corruption. See Croley, supra, at 717. For historical debates over the motives of the proponents for an
elective judiciary, see Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the
Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1680, 45 HISTORIAN 337 (1983); and Nelson, supra.
117. Kansas adopted an elective judiciary for appellate and inferior judges when it entered the
Union in 1859. When Iowa entered the Union its constitution only provided for the popular election of
inferior court judges. In 1857 the Iowa constitution was amended to provide for a three-member
Supreme Court elected at large by the people of Iowa for staggered terms of six years, with trial judges
also elected by the people. See Hall, supra note 116, at 337 n.2; A Brief History of the Iowa Judicial
Branch, available at http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/about/history/bief.asp (2001).
118. The Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was formed in Chicago in 1873. The
WCTU was first led by Annie Wittenmyer, but surged to national prominence under Frances Willard,
who took control of the WCTU in 1879. A "potent politician," Willard attracted converts through
nationwide speaking tours, and by 1890 the WCTU had 160,000 members. By 1911, with 245,000
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right to vote during the period of the Liquor Abatement acts," 9 their
movement for reform exerted pressure on male political culture through
lobbying, legislation, and moral suasion. 12 0 The responsiveness of elected
judges to public sentiment has been documented by Jed Handelsman
Shugerman in his study of the adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands.'2 1
Shugerman observed that almost all the states that adopted an elective
judiciary in the period after 1846 also adopted Rylands' strict liability
standard, whereas the federal courts' appointed life-term judges resisted
transforming the common law doctrines in spite of the public outrage over
bursting dams.'
Nonetheless, the rise of an elective judiciary can only provide a partial
explanation for the acceptance of the Liquor Abatement laws by state
courts. Massachusetts and New Hampshire - two of the eight states that
had enacted Liquor Abatement laws by 1892 - were also the only two
states to convene a constitutional convention between 1846 and 1860 and
retain an appointed judiciary. 123 One suspects that the principal causative
agent for the shift in public nuisance doctrines, even in states with
appointed judges, was the general force of the temperance movement,
especially the growing power of the Women's Christian Temperance
Union in the late nineteenth century.
The distance the Littleton court traveled from the common law doctrine
of public nuisance can be illustrated in this comparison of the common
law doctrine with the holding in Littleton:
members, the WCTU was the largest single women's organization ever. NANCY WOLOCH, WOMEN
AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 333 (2d ed. 1994).
119. Between 1870 and 1890, suffragists convinced eight states to hold referenda on women's
right to vote and lost all eight times. More often, suffragists were unable to convince state legislators
even to call for a referendum. See id.
120. See RUTH BORDIN, WOMEN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND LIBERTY,
1873-1900 (1990). Although it may seem counterintuitive that disenfranchised women could exert any
meaningful influence on male political culture during this period, historians of late nineteenth and
early twentieth American history have argued that the creation of separate female sphere helped
mobilize women and gained for them political leverage in the larger society. See Estelle Freeman,
Separatism as Strategy: Female Institution Building and American Feminism, 1870-1930, 5 FEMINIST
STUD. 512 (1979), reprinted in KATHRYN KISH SKLAR & THOMAS DUBLIN, 2 WOMEN AND POWER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY FROM 1870, at 12 (1991). Drawing on the work of Habermas, Sklar has argued
that women's political culture during this period was able to influence male political culture by
altering the discourse concerning various social ills that plagued American society. See KATHRYN
KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL
CULTURE, 1830-1900 (1995).
121. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), revd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), ajfd, 3 L.R.-E & L
App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
122. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs
and the Adoption ofFletcher v. Rylands in the GildedAge, 110 YALE L.J. 333,374-75 (2000).
123. See Hall, supra note 116, at 337-38. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, although appointed,
appears to have been sensitive to public sentiment during this period. See Shugerman, supra note 122,
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COMMON LAW OF PUBLIC LITTLETON V. FRITZ
NUISANCE
1. Public nuisance is a criminal 1. Public nuisance is both criminal
action; defendants are tried at law and civil; defendants can be tried at
law and/or equity
2. Injuries to persons are tried at 2. Injuries to property and injuries to
law; equity only has jurisdiction persons can be tried at equity
over injuries to property
3. Only public officials may abate 3. Legislature can confer standing on
a public nuisance unless plaintiff individuals not directly affected by a
has suffered special injury nuisance
4. Defendant has right to trial by 4. Defendant has no right to trial by
jury jury if the action is brought in equity
5. An adequate remedy at law 5. Remedies at law and equity serve
denies equity jurisdiction over a different purposes; concurrent
public nuisance case jurisdiction and concurrent remedies
are permitted
At the federal level, the liquor interests fared no better. In Mugler v.
Kansas,'24 the United States Supreme Court rejected the claims of liquor
sellers that the Liquor Abatement laws constituted an uncompensated
taking of property, and had deprived them of due process of law and the
right to a trial by jury. The Court dispensed with the takings claim under
what is now called the "nuisance exception to the taking guarantee.
'"125
The Court rejected the due process claim on the grounds that the statute
was a lawful exercise of the state's police powers and that a court of
equity was a proper place to abate a public nuisance. The latter claim was
somewhat debatable, since the common law defined public nuisances as
criminal actions. In support of this position, however, the Court cited
Justice Story's claim that equity had maintained jurisdiction over public
nuisances since the time of Queen Elizabeth.126 Once the Court had
determined that the abatement of liquor sales was not a criminal action, it
considered the question of trial by jury to be irrelevant since this mode of
trial was not required by suits in equity to abate a public nuisance.'27 Thus,
in one decision, the Supreme Court gave its tacit approval to the statutory
changes that were sweeping over public nuisance law. After 1887, the
determination of the relationship between equity courts and public
nuisance law would be left to the state legislatures and state courts. The
question that remained to be answered was whether the Littleton
124. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
125. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 144-46 n.8 (1978) (Rehnquist J.,
dissenting); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
126. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 672-73.
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conception of that relationship would become the norm or the exception.
D. Critical Reactions and the Progressive Response
This expansion of public nuisance law and injunctive relief did not go
unchallenged. Throughout the period of 1885 to 1925, there was a
countervailing movement of functionalist and formalist critiques that
sought to maintain the structure of the common law of public nuisance.
Some of the criticism was simply a resistance to doctrinal innovation by a
generation of legal scholars who had been educated that there were certain
fundamental legal principles of Anglo-American law: Equity did not
exercise criminal jurisdiction, equity only exercised jurisdiction where
there was no adequate remedy at law, individuals could not bring public
nuisance actions unless they had suffered special injury, and equity courts
only granted injunctive relief for injuries to property, not injuries to
persons."' Consider, for example, this stirring exposition in the Chicago
Legal News129 on the importance of the "adequacy of remedy" as a basis
for equity jurisdiction: "The first and most important of these principles,
and one which lies at the foundation of the entire jurisdiction by injunction
is, that the relief is never granted where the party aggrieved has a full and
adequate remedy at law ...., If one believed this was a fundamental
principle of the law, it is easier to see why decisions such as Littleton, with
its concurrent remedy/concurrent jurisdiction holding, would have
provoked such resistance.
Many of the critiques, however, had deeper philosophical objections to
the transformation of public nuisance. Of concern to many of these critics
was a fear that the recent transformations in public nuisance law had
undermined the important safeguard of trial by jury as well as breached
the line separating public and private rights. The fear was that individual
rights and liberties would be crushed as society moved towards a revival
of criminal equity controlled by the masses.
One of the earliest expressions of these criticisms can be found in
Justice Field's dissent in Carleton v. Rugg,'31 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court decision upholding that state's Liquor Abatement law.132 Similar
to the court in State v. Crawford, Justice Field alleged that the underlying
purpose of the statute was to effect a criminal prosecution while avoiding
128. See, e.g., Rounds, supra note 59 (decrying the Liquor Abatement laws as doctrinal violations
of the common law of public nuisance).
129. The Chicago Legal News was a weekly newspaper that began publishing in 1868. It was
described as containing "fresh reports and decisions, short and pertinent articles upon topics of present
interest, [and] a large quantity of legal advertisements." American Law Periodicals, supra note 55, at
449.
130. J.L. High, Outlines of the Law ofInjunction, 7 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 215,216 (1874-75).
131. 22 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1889).
132. MASS GEN. LAWSch. 380 § 1(1887).
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trial by jury.133 Without uttering its name, Justice Field accused the
majority of resurrecting Star Chamber and its lack of institutional
safeguards against judicial tyranny from the grave of Anglo-American
legal history:
And, if this can be done, why can it not authorize a court to enjoin
any person from doing any illegal or criminal act anywhere within
the commonwealth, and to try without a jury any person so enjoined,
on a charge of having violated the injunction, and to punish him by
fine and imprisonment, without limit, if the court find him guilty....
It was not the intention of the constitution that persons should be
punished for violating general laws by proceedings in equity, or by a
court acting upon its power to fine and imprison except at its own
discretion. 
134
Later critics generally followed Justice Field in focusing on the absence
of trial by jury and the revival of criminal equity.'35 For example, Henry
Schofield feared that the expansion of equitable jurisdiction had ushered
in an era of judicial tyranny, "unrestrained by the common sense of the
community voiced by twelve good men and true in the jury box."'
136
Others feared mob rule if the special injury requirement was abandoned.'37
In response to these criticisms, Progressive social reformers countered
that the common law doctrines had to be jettisoned because criminal
public nuisance prosecutions could not provide an adequate remedy at
law. The Progressive perception of the remedy at law was that police
graft, political corruption, and commercial vice (i.e., liquor and
prostitution) interests had conspired to undermine the efficacy of the
criminal justice system. The Progressive loss of faith in public institutions
is succinctly captured in the following excerpt from one of the first
scholarly attempts' 38 to explain the transformation in public attitudes
133. See Carleton, 22 N.E. at 58-60 (Field, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 60-61. See also Chafee, supra note 84, at 399 (arguing that there must be some limit on
the power of the legislature to transfer crimes into equity courts under the title of public nuisance).
135. See, e.g., Robert N. Golding, Constitutional Question Involved in the Abatement and
Injunction Sections of the National Prohibition Act, 19 ILL. L. REv. 71 (1924); E.W. Grant, The
Abatement of Public Nuisances, 40 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 410 (1908); Edwin S. Mack, The Revival of
Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1903); Henry Schofield, supra note 59.
136. Id. at 33.
137. See Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 924-25 (8th Cir. 1897) (Caldwell, J., dissenting)
("But the logical difficulty with this reasoning is that it confers jurisdiction on the mob equally with
the Chancellor. Those who justify or excuse mob law do it upon the ground that the administration of
criminal justice is slow and expensive, and the result sometimes unsatisfactory. It can make little
difference to the victims of short-cut and unconstitutional methods whether it is the mob or the
Chancellor that deprives them of their constitutional rights."); Grant, supra note 135, at 411 ("To
allow anyone of the public to abate such a nuisance, when he is in no special way incommoded,
inconvenienced, or damaged, leaves a naturally dangerous remedy, liable to great abuse.").
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towards segregated vice districts during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries:
Corruption or graft is a prolific hindrance to proper law enforcement.
Where the mayor of a city or other officials have been elected to
office with the aid of 'entrenched interests,' where dishonest and
inefficient police or court officers are subject to bribery, where the
court rulings or the disposition of cases are made to serve
questionable ends, where the public is inert ... corruption and graft
are bound to be obstacles to law enforcement.13 9
In regard to the specific issue of red-light districts, the Progressives
documented how segregated vice districts served to finance public
services. For example, in hearings before the Wisconsin State Vice
Commission, it was shown that the town of Superior relied upon returns
from its red-light district to fund municipal expenses. 4 ° Beyond financial
necessity, this alliance of vice interests and city hall was seen as having a
corrosive effect on public government:
"Prostitution, like every other criminal activity, goes into politics,
intrenches itself behind the unscrupulous precinct and ward leader, and
uses every method of bribery, corruption, and intimidation to maintain
itself free from interference.'41 Regulation and segregation [are] corrupting
the civic life of those communities which permit[] them." '42
The police were considered particularly corrupted by the temptations of
graft. As Attorney General George Cosson of Iowa once stated, "You
the ASHA's staff and files, and he published several articles in the Journal of Social Hygiene. See
Joseph Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice 7 & n.2 (1922) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota, ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24). The
excerpt from Mayer's dissertation, therefore, is emblematic of the Progressive attitude towards public
institutions as well as the concerns that animated the movement to enact the Red Light Abatement
laws.
139. See, e.g., id. at 15.
140. Financing a City by Returns From Vice, 31 SURvEY 512, 512-13 (1914) (documenting how
license fees, in the guise of fines, generated $12,000 a year in revenue). See also Frederick W. Betts,
History of the Moral Survey Committee of Syracuse, 1 J. SOC. HYGIENE 183, 185 (observing linkages
between corrupt political machines and the profits generated from commercialized vice); ASHA, The
Segregation of Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution
(1916) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State
Laws, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota) (denouncing municipal disgrace of
sharing in the proceeds of prostitution through petty fines). But see Virginia Brooks, Address, 2
VIGILANCE 1, 11 (1912) (alleging that the red-light district depleted the treasury of West Hammond,
Illinois, in addition to corrupting its public officials and demoralizing its police force); George Cosson,
Why an Injunction and Abatement Law? 16 AM. CITY 44,44 (1917) (arguing that only an infinitesimal
amount of money ever made it into the city treasury because of embezzlement by corrupt police and
politicians).
141. Bascom Johnson, Civic Housecleaning, 14 J. Soc. HYGIENE 464,467 (1928).
142. Walter Clarke, Vice Repression as War Policy, 3, 5 (1917) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files,
Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 17 (1920) ("Segregation
means graft and corruption among public officials.").
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cannot have a segregated vice district without having a corrupted police
force."' 143 In some cases the police were portrayed as helpless victims of
the forces of corruption, 4 4 while in others they were viewed as using their
positions of power to extort money from the victimized prostitute or
illegal liquor sellers.145 As a result of this corruption, the police could not
be counted on to pursue vice investigations.146 In Chicago, the Committee
of Fifteen documented how its own investigators found evidence of
prostitution at a certain building that six policemen had conveniently
overlooked: "Were these policemen blind or devoid of reason and
logic; ... were the instructions given in such a way that the men knew that
they were not to see or hear or find anything of a questionable nature? Let
me leave those questions with you. .. ."' The Committee of Fifteen
143. Publicity Committee Law Enforcement League, An Ancient Evil: Regulation or Suppression,
Bulletin No. 3 (n.d.) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement,
1911-24, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 10 (1916) ("We say unequivocally that without collusion with the police,
commercialized vice could not flourish in Chicago.").
144. See Clifford W. Barnes, The Story of the Committee of Fifteen of Chicago, 4 J. SOC.
HYGIENE 145, 156 (1918) ("Segregation means protected vice, and you can't have protected vice
without running the big risk of seeing your law enforcing officials corrupted. The temptation seems
too great. The policeman on the beat goes to pieces very quickly after he once takes graft from the vice
districts. Grafting off these pitiable creatures is unspeakable, and at that it is but the first step in a
career that sinks deeper in infamy very rapidly. The policeman who takes this kind of graft will take
graft from pickpockets, thugs, gunmen, and burglars."); ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and
the Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140 ("Is it reasonable to
expect the policeman to remain uncorrupted when he is tempted by public toleration of
commercialized prostitution to confer illegal privilege by winking at law-breaking?"); ASHA,
Segregation of Prostitution (n.d.) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and
Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota) (repeating same
complaint).
145. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 12 (1917) (accusing Chicago
policemen of engaging in "official pandering"); THE VICE COMMISSION OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL
EVIL IN CtIICAGO 29 (1911) (denouncing the "System which makes it easier for the police to accept
graft from the tremendous profits reaped from the sale in women's bodies than to honestly do their
duty"); Clarke, supra note 142, at 3, 5 (asserting that the corruption of the police force through vice
was "notorious" and "often led to a system of general 'protection' for criminals of all classes"); Ann
Garlin Spencer, State Regulation of Vice and its Meaning, 49 FORUM 587, 595, 599-600 (1913)
(decrying "police terrorism" against prostitutes in segregated vice districts); Graham Taylor, Reviews
the Situation, 2 VIGILANCE 1,22 (1912) (noting that police graft from prostitution and liquor sales was
treated as a "vested right"); Editorial, The Regulation of Prostitution the Proper Field for the Health
Department, 33 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 7, 7 (1916) (citing unofficial monthly $25 per prostitute fee levied
on brothels as evidence of "lucrative" police graft); J. Lionberger Davis, Argument in Support of the
Injunction and Abatement Bill (Senate Bill Number 14) for the Abolition offHouses of Prostitution in
Missouri, 1, 8 (1915) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement,
1911-24, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota) (asserting that segregated vice
districts have corrupted the police forces and courts, leaving citizens helpless to protect themselves).
146. In response to widespread corruption, one editorial even called for the abolition of the police
department. Editorial, Police Graft, 33 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 5, 5 (1916).
147. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 3 (1920). See also THE VICE COMMISSION
OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO, supra note 145, at 160 (describing the general
lawlessness of the Chicago police department: "[O]fficers on the beat are bold and open in their
neglect of duty, drinking in saloons while in uniform, ignoring the solicitations of prostitutes in rear
rooms and on the streets, selling tickets at dances frequented by ... prostitutes; protecting 'cadets,'
prostitutes and saloon keepers of disorderly places.").
27
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likewise accused the police of actively protecting vice interests: "We have
found policemen going personally and collecting tribute from women, and
giving evidence of their willingness to protect vicious resorts by taking the
keepers to the Morals Court to point out certain officers of the law against
whom the women should be on guard."'
148
In the unlikely event that public officials actually prosecuted a public
nuisance claim against commercialized vice, Progressives countered that
the jury system could not be relied upon to return a guilty verdict.
Progressives feared jury nullification from jurors who were the recipients
of graft, in the employ of commercialized vice interests, or even
participants in the vice.' 49 Describing the experience in Iowa, Wirt Hallam
wrote:
For years [the public authorities] have passed laws and attempted
prosecutions, but with little success. Many people regarded the [red-
light district] as necessary and inevitable; grand juries would not
indict; petit juries would not convict .... It was sometimes found that
one man on the jury-from prejudice, corruption or a
misunderstanding of the nature of his duties-would defeat the laws
of the State and the judgment of the other eleven men on the jury.10
Some reformers suggested that there should be "schemes" through
which "unfit persons" could be kept out of the jury box.15' Others
despaired of reforming the jury system at all.'52
Legal practitioners and academic scholars who criticized the Injunction
and Abatement laws did not actually dispute the Progressive depiction of
the criminal justice system. These practitioners and scholars likewise
decried the lax enforcement of public nuisance laws, the low standards of
juries, the weakness of prosecuting attorneys, and the obscurant
technicality of criminal law.'53 They viewed the expansion of equitable
jurisdiction as a "sad commentary" on people's faith in the criminal justice
system: "[P]eople are becoming afraid of their own institutions; afraid of
148. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 10 (1916). See also Wirt W. Hallam, The
Reduction of Vice in Certain Western Cities Through Law-Enforcement, in REPORT OF THE MORAL
SURVEY COMMITTEE ON THE SOcIAL EVIL 109 (1913) (noting secret financial contributions available
to any official who will neglect to prosecute criminals).
149. See Current Topics, 15 CENT. L.J. 441,441 (1882) (noting unwillingness ofjuries to convict
in liquor cases); Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice, supra note 138, at 16 ("Common
juries reflect the sentiment of the particular local community from which they are drawn; and although
the state legislature may pass a very admirable law and judges uniformly uphold it, juries may still
hamper enforcement by refusing to convict under it."). But see Golding, supra note 135, at 77
(acknowledging the problem of jury nullification in liquor cases, but countering that this problem has
abated with National Prohibition).
150. Hallam, supra note 148, at 112.
151. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 7 (1922).
152. See Cosson, supra note 140, at 45 (describing "utter inadequacy" of the jury system based
upon his experiences as a county attorney in Iowa).
153. Mack, supra note 135, at 403.
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trial by jury; afraid of the cherished guarantees of civil liberty derived
through the Magna Charta and enshrined in their constitutions .... ,,154
These critics even conceded that equity bench trials might have become
more palatable as an increasing percentage of the judiciary was elected.' 55
In spite of these concessions, they also believed that the Progressive cure
to the social evil problem - abandonment of the special injury rule and the
concomitant transfer of criminal prosecutions into equity - was worse than
the disease. From the point of view of these critics, the Progressives had
simply traded one problem for another. In their desire to rid the nation of
the social evil, the Progressives had opened the door to the destruction of
individual liberties through criminal equity. Moreover, the Progressives
had undercut any possibility of reforming the common law system by
circumventing it. "If we were brought face to face with the problem of
maintaining order only by means of the criminal courts, though the
process might be slow, the final result would be that our criminal
prosecutions would be made effective .... 156
The critics' proposal that the common law of public nuisance be
maintained and its institutions reformed was simply untenable to
Progressive social reformers. First, Progressive reformers were not
interested in "slow" reforms, especially when the Injunction and
Abatement laws gave them a powerful - and constitutional - weapon
against vice. The struggle against the twin social evils of alcohol and
prostitution was a war, and the war was not going to be slowed in order to
preserve the doctrines of the common law. Second, the critics' proposal
that the Progressive reformers rely upon the workings of the criminal
justice system rested upon a faith in these institutions, a faith no longer
shared by many Progressive social reform groups. For Progressives, the
continued existence of liquor saloons and red-light districts was proof
positive that the contemporary political and legal systems did not work. A
large part of the appeal of the Injunction and Abatement laws was that
they took power out of the hands of corrupt juries and public officials and
transferred it to those whom the Progressives trusted - themselves.
Lastly, and most importantly, critics and Progressives espoused
differing notions of law's socio-political role. The critics' proposal
assumed a shared belief in the importance of the public-private distinction.
To the adherents of classical liberal thought, the primary function of law
was to preserve a sphere of liberty free from state interference. 157 By
contrast, Progressives who promoted and used the Injunction and
Abatement laws had a communitarian vision of society. They were not
154. Whitelock, supra note 83, at 108.
155. Mack, supra note 135, at 392.
156. Id. at 403.
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concerned with preserving an "oasis of private rights."' 58 Rather, the
Progressive social reformers were committed to finding a way of imposing
community norms on society. Private rights mattered little to the
Progressive social reformers if those rights conflicted with the rights of the
public.
II. THE RED LIGHT ABATEMENT LAWS
Doctrinally, the Red Light Abatement laws constituted an extension of
the transformations that had swept over public nuisance law in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. In practice, as well as in theory, the Red
Light Abatement laws were the descendants of the Liquor Abatement
statutes a generation earlier. In brief, the Red Light Abatement laws
allowed individuals to bring public nuisance actions in equity courts
against the operation of places of prostitution, lewdness and assignation.
The individual did not have to show special injury to have standing.
Rather, standing was conferred jurisdictionally by citizenship in a county,
city or state. Initially, an individual could ask for a temporary injunction
restraining the property owner from continuing the nuisance. At a later
hearing, the court would decide if the evidence warranted a permanent
injunction and an abatement of the nuisance. Under an order of abatement,
the building was closed for up to one year. The personalty used in
conducting the nuisance - pretty much everything in the building - was
removed and sold. In some states, the owner was also assessed a $300
"tax". If the owner violated the injunction and abatement order, he could
be fined up to $1,000 and imprisoned in the county jail for up to six
months.' 59 Although advocates of the Red Light Abatement laws stressed
that this law was a civil action,16 it was in fact a form of criminal equity -
the privatization of public nuisance prosecutions in chancery courts.
In spite of the doctrinal similarities between the Red Light Abatement
laws and the preceding Liquor Abatement statutes, the emergence of these
anti-prostitution laws was not a foregone conclusion. The doctrinal
transformations in public nuisance law only made the Red Light
Abatement laws a theoretical possibility. It would take a discursive shift in
the Progressive conception of the prostitute, combined with an awareness
of the inadequacies of the common law remedies, to usher in the Red
Light Abatement laws.
158. Id.
159. See Letter from George Worthington to Alice L. Wooks (October 13, 1923) (ASHA, Legal
Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History
Archives, University of Minnesota); Davis, supra note 145, at 1, 7-8; Bascom Johnson, The Injunction
and Abatement Law, 1 J. SOC. HYGIENE 231, 232-33 (1915).
160. Letter from George Worthington to Alice L. Wooks, supra note 159 ("The Injunction and
Abatement Law is a civil law and not a criminal law.").
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A. From "Fallen Woman " to "White Slave'"
The fate of America's segregated red-light districts were intimately
connected to Progressive discourses on the prostitute. Throughout the
nineteenth century, the prostitute was viewed as a "fallen woman." On the
one hand, the fallen woman was viewed as degraded, miserably poor,
diseased and intellectually stunted. 6' On the other hand, she also
possessed agency - she was as much a victim of her lax morals and
willingness to follow a false code of luxury as she was of her bad
environment.1 62  This conception of the prostitute had important
implications for the segregated red-light district.
Historians of urban America have been intrigued by the cognitive
disjunction of red-light districts in a society that professed adherence to a
code of "civilized morality. '1 63 As defined by Mark Thomas Connelly,
civilized morality consisted of two related propositions: a belief in a
unified and responsible self that could (and must) control unruly and base
sexual instincts, combined with a faith that societal progress depended on
control of one's potentially dangerous sexual drive."6 Civilized morality
supported a code that strictly prohibited premarital sexual relations,
proclaimed marriage as the only context for sexual intercourse, and even
there, limited sexual relations to reproduction.165 Given this commitment
to marital fidelity and sexual restraint it seems incongruous that the
segregated red-light districts should have flourished during this period.
This incongruity is only superficial, since it was through the segregated
red-light district - and its array of fallen women - that respectable
Americans were able to define and maintain the meaning of civilized
morality. As Kai Erikson has observed, every group of people maintains
boundaries through negative identification against a despised Other.
"Deviant persons", in particular, "often supply an important service to
society by patrolling the outer edges of group space and by providing a
contrast which gives the rest of the community some sense of their own
territorial identity."1 66 The red-light district and its inherent Otherness
161. See Leslie Fishbein, Harlot or Heroine? Changing Views ofProstitution, 1870-1920, 43
HISTORIAN 23, 24 (1980); Kay Ann Holmes, Reflections by Gaslight: Prostitution in Another Age, 7
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 83, 88-90 (1972).
162. See Fishbein, supra note 161, at 24; TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, CITY OF EROS 271 (1992).
163. See, eg., Peter Baldwin, Antiprostitution Reform and the Use ofPublic Space in Hartford,
Connecticut, 1878-1914, 23 J. URB. HIST. 709, 709-710 (1997); Shumsky, supra note 1, at 665-67.
164. MARK THOMAS CONNELLY, THE RESPONSE TO PROSTITUTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 8
(1980).
165. Id.
166. KAI ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS, A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 196 (1966).
See also GILFOYLE, supra note 162, at 223 (emphasizing that middle-class New Yorkers imagined
prostitution to be contained in disreputable neighborhoods in order to create a "bourgeois ideal of city
life" that "divided the city into reputable and disreputable neighborhoods."); RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST
SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA, 1900-1918, at 78-79 (1982) (observing that "respectable
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provided a bright-line by which the middle-class could discem the
difference between acceptable and unacceptable sexual behavior.
167 It
provided both a physical and figurative demarcation of respectability.'
6 8
Key to this boundary formation was the conception of the prostitute as
possessing agency. The fallen woman in the bawdyhouse was an Other: a
"metaphor ' 169  for poorly-made choices and a foil against which
respectable women measured their own agency. The fallen woman could
be pitied, but she could also be blamed. Whereas the fallen woman had
given in to her base desires, the respectable woman outside the red-light
district had not. The promiscuity of the fallen woman highlighted the
chastity of women who stayed in the private home, while her presence in
an unruly slum contrasted with the quiet decorum of the respectable
woman's residential neighborhood."17
Although the segregated red-light district may have served a useful
boundary-defining purpose, it enjoyed an uneasy existence in nineteenth-
century society. Just as the red-light district provided a status signifier to
those possessing civilized morality, attempts to abolish it could also serve
to elevate the status of those possessing pure civilized morality above
those who tacitly sanctioned licentiousness.17 1 Throughout the nineteenth
century these "new abolitionists" sought to shut down red-light districts as
part of their crusade to purify America.' 72 The general failure of these
abolitionist attempts can be traced to several factors. Police graft
combined with ineffective laws made it difficult for the new abolitionists
to accomplish their goal. Equally important, there existed a countervailing
MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920, at 4-5 (1978) ("Very early, the realization
dawned that the urban order represented a volatile and unpredictable deviation from a familiar
norm.").
167. Shumsky, supra note 1, at 672. See also GILFOYLE, supra note 162, at 92-116 (noting that
efforts to define middle class respectability became more pronounced in nineteenth century New York
in response to the emergence of a male "sporting" culture that transgressed the boundary line between
respectability and criminality by embracing life in the red-light district); Balos & Fellows, supra note
12, at 1228-29, 1272, 1303 (asserting that prostitution has historically marked the boundary between
women society labels unworthy/degenerate and those whom society constructs as worthy/respectable).
168. Shumsky, supra note 1, at 671-72.
169. Timothy J. Gilfoyle, Prostitutes in History: From Parables of Pornography to Metaphors of
Modernity, 104AM.lHIST. REV. 117, 138(1999).
170. Baldwin, supra note 163, at 709-10.
171. The recent efforts to "clean up" Times Square illustrate how eliminating vice districts can
still serve as status signifiers for moral reformers. See Balos & Fellows, supra note 12, at 1288
(observing that the efforts to "clean up" Times Square "demonstrate how our culture continues to
police the boundaries between respectable middle-class homes and families and the degenerate streets
represented by prostitution and related activities."); see also Harry M. Clor, The Death of Public
Morality? 45 AM. J. JURIS. 33, 44-45 (2000) (citing the "clean-up" of Times Square under Rudolph
Giuliani as a "positive sign[]" of public morality); George Kannar, Introduction: The First Amendment
Revisited, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 398-400 (1998) (describing the "new" Times Square as a zone where
middle class pleasures are "sanitiz[ed].").
172. DAVID J. PIVAR, PURITY CRUSADE: SEXUAL MORALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 1868-1900,
at 3-12, 52-59 (1973).
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discourse that the segregated vice district was a "necessary evil." '173 This
necessity argument contended that the elimination of the segregated vice
district would unleash a parade of horribles on the moral citizens of
society. There was a concern that without outlets for male sexuality, pure,
virtuous women would become targets for pent-up male sexual
aggression. The segregated vice district functioned as a bulwark against
this "predatory male" by unleashing his "animal passions" on the immoral
fallen woman.1 74 As one resident of Connecticut succinctly put it, "To
have open houses [of prostitution] means protection for decent women." '175
A second concern was that elimination of the red-light district would
scatter prostitution into the virtuous quarters of society: "It regulates the
women so that they may live in one district to themselves instead of being
scattered over the city and filling our thoroughfares with street
walkers." 76 Another argument in favor of the segregated red-light district
was that it segregated vice generally. Not only did this protect the innocent
citizen from the robbers who lived among the wretched in the red-light
district, 77 but it also made the job of policing easier: "The segregated
district decreases crime by enabling police supervision of a recognized
crime center."' 78 As one Arkansas banker remarked, the red-light district
was "a necessity like a sewer ... ,"179 The analogy was an apt one. The
red-light district, like a sewer, segregated filth and then hid this filth
within specially contained areas. Abolishing the districts was akin to
abolishing the sewer system - it would allow the pent-up filth of society to
seep into virtuous residential neighborhoods.
But if nineteenth-century abolitionists were unsuccessful in eliminating
173. See U.S. Public Health Service, An Open Forum on the "Open House", 10 (1921) (ASHA,
Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History
Archives, University of Minnesota) ("Houses of prostitution are necessary evils.... [T]hcy arc
naturally required." "Prostitution is a necessity.").
174. ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against
Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140. See also Franklin Hichbom, The Organization that Backed the
California Red Light Abatement Bill, I J. Soc. HYGIENE 194, 196 (1915).
175. U.S. Public Health Service, An Open Forum on the "Open House", supra note 173, at 10.
176. FRED MAZZULLA & Jo MAZZULLA, BRASS CHECKS AND RED LIGHTS 16 (1966); Pamela D.
Arceneaux, Guidebooks to Sin. The Blue Books of Storyville, 28 LA. HIST. 397, 401 (1987). See also
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN (1916); Hichborn, Organization that Backed the
California Red Light Abatement Bill, supra note 174, at 196; ASHA, Memorandum re New Jersey
Injunction and Abatement Act, 2 (May 10, 1916) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 1:
Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota); ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against
Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140.
177. MAZZULLA & MAZZULLAsupra note 176, at 16; Arceneaux, supra note 176, at 401.
178. U.S. Public Health Service, An Open Forum on the "Open House" 10 (1921) (ASHA, Legal
Rcfcrence Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History
Archives, University of Minnesota).
179. Id. See also David C. Humphrey, Prostitution and Public Policy in Austin, Texas, 1870-
1915, 86 Sw. HIST. Q. 473, 497 (1983) ("Even those Austinites who condoned Guy Town [i.e, the
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the red-light district, nor were those who advocated legalizing and
regulating them. The one great nineteenth-century experiment with
regulating prostitution in the United States occurred in St. Louis, Missouri.
In 1870, the St. Louis City Council exploited a loophole in a state law to
legislate regulated prostitution. 80 Under its "Social Evil Ordinance," the
St. Louis City Council went farther than any American city in adopting the
French or continental system of "reglementation."'' The city council
turned over the administration of prostitution to the Board of Health,
which had the power to issue licenses to both houses and women, as well
as the power to appoint six physicians to check the women's health.18 2 As
implemented, the St. Louis regulatory system had three elements: required
weekly medical inspections, isolation and treatment of infected prostitutes,
and strict control over prostitutes' residences and public behavior.
183
Through licensing fees, the Board of Health paid for women's medical
bills and even bought a house to use as a special "social evil hospital."'184
In theory, the reglementation of prostitution could have operated
harmoniously within the boundary-forming discourse of civilized
morality. As implemented by the St. Louis Board of Health,
reglementation only sanitized the worst excesses of the segregated vice
"sewer." The fallen woman still remained an Other - albeit in a slightly
less malignant form - against which virtuous civilized men and women
could measure their morality. Although the architects of the St. Louis
experiment may not have intended to transgress the boundary signifiers of
the red-light district, an unintended effect of the Social Evil Ordinance
was that it gave St. Louis prostitutes a new sense of respectability and
legitimacy.'8 5 This new-found sense of respectability emboldened the
prostitutes to participate in public life outside the red-light district. The
peak of visibility (and arguably, public acceptance) was reached in
February, 1874, when most of the leading "ladies of the evening"
appeared at a Mardi-Gras ball that included leading politicians,
businessmen, young ladies and the chief of police.'8 6 The increasing
visibility of the prostitute in civil society heightened anxiety among much
of the public who feared the disintegration of social boundaries.' 87 Within
180. PIVAR, supra note 172, at 52; John C. Burnham, The Social Evil Ordinance-A Social
Experiment in Nineteenth Century St. Louis, 27 BULL. Mo. HIST. Soc'y 203, 204-05 (1971); Duane R.
Sneddeker, Regulating Vice: Prostitution and the St. Louis Social Evil Ordinance, 1870-1874, 11
GATEWAY HERITAGE 20, 23 (1990).
181. MACKEY, supra note 20, at 213; Burnham, supra note 180180, at 205.
182. MACKEY, supra note 20, at 213; Sneddeker, supra note 180, at 24-25.
183. See Burnham, supra note 180180, at 206; Sneddeker, supra note 180, at 24-25.
184. MACKEY, supra note 2020, at 213; Burnham, supra note 180, at 206-09; Sneddeker, supra
note 180, at 24-25.
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a month of the Mardi Gras ball, the St. Louis experiment was over and the
red-light district returned to its nebulous state of quasi-illegality.
The failures of both the abolitionists and the St. Louis Social Evil
Ordinance are illustrative of the ambiguous position that the prostitute and
the red-light district occupied in nineteenth-century society. Although
illegal, the existence of the segregated vice district was justified as a
"necessary evil." It provided a bulwark against those elements of society
that could not be fully controlled - male passion, lustful women, and
social parasites. But the red-light district also provided a measuring stick
for evaluating female agency. Women who exercised their agency poorly,
by following their passions or deceiving themselves, could be located
physically within the red-light district. By contrast, the antithesis of the
fallen woman, the respectable woman who made moral choices, lived
outside its boundaries.
The liminal position of the red-light district in nineteenth-century
American society is a reflection of its unsettled status within the
Progressive mind. On the one hand, the continued existence of segregated
vice districts was anxiety-producing. Within the red-light district was all
the passion, vice, and corruption that civil society could not control. It
represented a physical locus of anti-civilized morality. On the other hand,
the segregated vice district was status-affirming. It provided an Other
against which the ethos of civilized morality could define itself. All that
the Other was, civilized morality was not - and vice versa. Moreover, the
containment of the red-light district within a particularized physical space
held out the possibility that the two worlds could remain separate. So long
as the boundary-line was assiduously maintained, the world of civilized
morality could remain free of contamination. Thus, between the extremes
of regulation and abolitionism America's red-light districts enjoyed a
precarious existence.
The event that shifted the discourse on the red-light district was the
discovery of "white slavery." Beginning in the early 1900s, America
awoke to a startling new threat: the "existence" of an international
conspiracy to seduce, entrap and ultimately enslave (white) American girls
into a life of prostitution. Historian Mark Thomas Connelly has described
the indignation and concern over white slavery as "intense, widespread,
and often hysterical."' 88 The period between 1909 and World War I was a
particularly prodigious period for the production of white slave narratives
with such graphic titles as Truthful and Chaste Account of the Hideous
Trade of Buying and Selling Young Girls for Immoral Purposes, The
House of Bondage, and Graphic Accounts of How White Slaves are
Ensnared and a Full Exposition of the Methods and Schemes used to Lure
188. CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 115. Chapter six to Connelly's work documents the various
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and Trap the Girls.' 9 White slavery even made it onto the new medium of
film. 9' These lurid and melodramatic narratives served to inflame the
nation into what historians and contemporaries have called a "scare" or
"hysteria."'
191
Also fanning the flames of the white slavery hysteria were the vice
commission reports. Between 1911 and 1916, over thirty-three cities
issued reports on the social evil problem in their communities, including
such little-known hot-beds of vice as Elmira, New York (1913) and Bay
City, Michigan (1914).'92 In general, the vice commission reports lacked
the sensationalistic tone of the white slave narratives. What the vice
commission reports lacked in hysteria, however, they more than made up
for in reams of data and documentation detailing the vast enterprise of
commercialized vice. 93 Laid bare before the world were the wages
women earned as prostitutes, the aggregate profits of vice districts and the
personal histories of the young women. 194 "One can sense, even in the
controlled and neutral format, the psychological impact of this
material."' 9
Who was the white slave? The white slave narratives paint a portrait of
the white slave as an innocent, pre-sexual young girl who had been tricked
into a life of prostitution. As Connelly observed in his discussion of the
white slave narratives, the description of the white slave's plight were
shockingly uniform:
Typically, a chaste and comely native American country girl would
forsake her idyllic country home and family for the promise of the
189. See id. at 114-15 (noting that between 1909 and 1914 that at least twenty-two white slave
narratives were published, and that by 1912 Reginald Wright Kauffman's best-selling white-slavery
novel, The House of Bondage, was already in its fourteenth edition - only two years afier its initial
publication!); DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE
MANN ACT 33 (1994).
190. CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 115; GILFOYLE, supra note 162, at 275; LANGUM, supra note
188, at 33-34.
191. ALLAN M. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1880, at 34 (1987); CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 114-35; JOHN D'EMILIO &
ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 203 (1988),
LANGUM, supra note 189, at 15-47; ROSEN, supra note 166, at 115; The White Slave Films, 106
OUTLOOK 120, 121 (1914); Is White Slavery Nothing More than a Myth?, 55 CURRENT OPINION 348,
348(1913).
192. For a list of these cities, see Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice, supra note
138, at 52. One historian has argued that the vice commission reports were "a manifestation of
profound guilt and urban soul-searching, triggered by the realization of the vast and irreversible
transformation that the triumph of the industrial city had imposed on traditional American folkways."
CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 104.
193. Connelly argues that the vice commissions' reports on the staggering size of commercialized
vice fed into Progressive fears about unnatural concentrations of power. See id. at 101-02.
194. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE SOCIAL EVIL CONDITIONS OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 156-70
(1913-14); THE VICE COMMISSION OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO, supra note 145145, at
69-116.
195. CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 101.
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city. On the way, or shortly after her arrival, she would fall victim to
one of the swarm of panders lying in wait for just such an innocent
and unprotected sojourner. Using one of his vast variety of tricks-a
promise of marriage, an offer to assist in securing lodging, or, if these
were to no avail, the choloroformed cloth, the hypodermic needle, or
the drugged drink-the insidious white slaver would brutally seduce
the girl and install her in a brothel, where she became an enslaved
prostitute. Within five years she would end up in potter's filed, unless
she had the good fortune to be "rescued" by a member of one of the
dedicated group fighting white slavery.' 
96
In comparison to her kindred sister, the fallen woman, the white slave
lacked agency. The white slave was a pure victim. She was young and
innocent. She did not choose a life of prostitution, it was imposed upon
her by evil men. One historian has described her as a "romantic object of
charity, compassion and sympathetic understanding."'1 97 And Edwin W.
Sims, United States Attorney in Chicago during this period stated, "The
characteristic which distinguishes the white slave traffic from immorality
in general is that the women who are the victims of the traffic are
unwillingly forced to live an immoral life. ' 98 A typology of the two
women reveals their fundamental differences:
FALLEN WOMAN WHITE SLAVE
DOMiNANT ERA 19 th Century 1900-1917
AUTONOMY Possesses agency No agency
AGE Adult woman Young girl
CHARACTERISTICS Promiscuous, diseased Innocent, pre-sexual
PUBLIC Common prostitute: Victim
CONCEPTION immoral, blameworthy,
lacking respectability
PUBLIC RESPONSE Condemnation Rescue
LEGAL RESPONSE Restriction of prostitution Mann Act, Red
to segregated districts Light Abatement
Laws
Most historians agree that the existence of white slavery was greatly
overstated. There is some evidence of coerced prostitution during this
period, but very little.199 Or at least not enough to justify the level of
196. Id.atII5-16.
197. Roy Lubove, The Progressives and the Prostitute, 24 HISTORIAN 308, 318 (1962).
198. The "White Slave" Revelations, 47 CURRENT LIT. 594, 595 (1909) (emphasis mine). Sims
later became the Secretary of the Committee of Fifteen in Chicago. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEEOF FIFTEEN 1 (1913).
199. LANGUM, supra note 188, at 35; Robert E. Riegel, Changing American Attitudes Toward
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hysteria. One historian has concluded that "[t]he belief in a widespread
organization to enslave unwilling prostitutes was at least a gross
exaggeration. Prostitution was, of course, a business, frequently involving
organization at the local level, but there was no national or international
organization."' 0 In order to explain the hysteria surrounding white
slavery, historians have focused on how the prostitution "problem"
became a flash point for a series of anxieties that permeated American
society at the turn of the century.
One anxiety concerned the generational and familial stresses wrought
by the migration of young daughters to urban centers. "The white slave
narratives appeared at precisely the time when it was becoming clear that
many young women had recently left, or were leaving, the small towns
and rural areas for the cities."' ' Feeding this anxiety was a conception of
the city as an illusive trap set carefully for young country virgins.0 2 As
one Progressive era tract recommended, "The best and the surest way for
parents of girls in the country to protect them from the clutches of the
'white slaver' is to keep them in the country. 20 3
Along with this fear of urbanism, the vice commissions and other
Progressive groups drew a connection between low wages and
prostitution. 204 In its findings of fact, the Illinois Senate Vice Committee
placed the problem of prostitution clearly on the shoulders of industrial
capitalism:
1. That poverty is the principal cause, direct and indirect, of
prostitution.
2. That thousands of girls are driven into prostitution because of the
sheer inability to keep body and soul together on the low wages
received by them.
3. That thousands of girls are forced into industrial employment by
the low wages received by their fathers. .20
200. Id. at 450.
201. CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 124. See also LANGUM, supra note 188, at 19 ("Women's
entry into prostitution, especially of innocent American farm girls, seemed to be caused by the city
itself.").
202. Egal Fedlman, Prostitution, the Alien Woman and the Progressive Imagination. 1910-1915,
19 AM. Q. 192,194 (1967).
203. FIGHTING THE TRAFFIC IN YOUNG GIRLS, OR WAR ON THE WHITE SLAVE TRADE 70-71
(Ernest A. Bell ed., 1910).
204. See REPORT ON THE SOCIAL EVIL CONDITIONS OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, supra note 193, at
156-70; THE VICE COMMISSION OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO, supra note 145, at 69-
116; Are Low Wages Responsible for Women's Immorality? " 54 CURRENT OPINION 402, 402 (1913);
Economic Necessity, 26 VIGILANCE 1, 1 (1913); Wages and Immorality, 27 VIGILANCE 18, 18 (1913).
See also Riegel, supra note 199, at 449-50 (describing the economic causation arguments of such
Progressive era social reformers as Jane Addams and Emma Goldman).
205. Barrat O'Hara, Report of the Illinois Senate Vice Committee, 33 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 19, 19
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Connelly has also suggested that this link between "wage slavery" and
"white slavery" may have tapped into Progressive fears over "reification"
- the necessity in capitalistic society to turn all relationships into
relationships between things or commodities.
2°6
The white slavery scare also captured an increasing anxiety over the
racial integrity of the nation. The white slave tracts placed the
responsibility for white slavery on immigrants,2 °7 with eastern and
southern European immigrants most often identified as the culprits. 0 8
Turn-of-the-century Americans feared that the nation, through its lax
immigration policies, had unleashed a foreign menace on its innocent
young girls.
But perhaps at the center of the white slavery hysteria was an anxiety
over public expressions of female sexuality. Historian Kathy Peiss has
argued that the massive entrance of young women into the industrial labor
pool in the early twentieth century created a distinct working-class culture
in which sexual expressiveness was an important dimension. 209 Young
women found that dance halls, nickel theaters and amusements parks
provided a zone in which they transgress norms of female sexuality and
engage in more open heterosocial interactions."'0 The anxieties generated
by these transformations in female sexuality are nicely encapsulated in
this alarmist report from the Minneapolis Vice Commission:
One of the most disturbing phases of the present situation in
Minneapolis, and an alarming social symptom, is the large number of
young girls in the streets at night in the down-town sections, and in
the business districts of the outlying sections.
The growing looseness of discipline in the home, a certain measure
(1916). See also REPORT OF THE SENATE VICE COMMITTEE, STATE OF ILLINOIS 669 (1916) (Chairman
O'Hara: "Do you think low wages, Mr. Swift, has anything to with morality either directly or
indirectly?").
206. CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 102.
207. Id. at 48-66; LANGUM, supra note 188, at 18-19; Fedlman, supra note 202, at 194-97.
208. One prominent "authority" on the white-slavery panic, Clifford G. Roe, suggested that
degenerate southern European cultures were responsible for creating white slavers: "Italians and
Greeks have come into prominence in the pandering business .. .. Even the men who are well known
dealers in human flesh stand high among their own people ... and some have held positions of honor
and respect in their religious circles." CLIFFORD G. ROE, THE GREAT WAR ON WHITE SLAVERY 101
(1979). See also Fedlman, supra note 202, at 194 (observing that southern Italians and Russian Jews
were often connected with the international trade in white slaves).
209. Kathy Peiss, "Charity Girls" and City Pleasures: Historical Notes on Working-Class
Sexuality, 1880-1920s, in UNEQUAL SISTERS 157, 159 (Ellen Carol Dubois et al. eds., 1990). See also
BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN
REFORM TRADITION 185 (1987). For a contemporary discussion of the "charity girl" problem,
including the affidavits of vice commission investigators, see REPORT ON THE SOCIAL EVIL
CONDITIONS OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, supra note 193, at 11 -12,76-87.
210. KATHY PEISS, CHEAP AMUSEMENTS: WORKING WOMEN AND LEISURE IN TURN-OF-THE-
CENTURY NEW YORK 88-162 (1986) (arguing that dance halls, amusement parks and nickel theaters
were arenas in which new social-sexual relations developed).
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of independence of the authority of parents, due to the fact that so
many young girls are today wage earners, the enticements of the
public dance hall and the cheap theater, the lure of the automobile,
and finally the contagious love of diversion and excitement that
seemingly possesses all elements of society in our cities today, are
separately, or in combination, ascribed as the chief reason -
Minneapolis Vice Commission.211
The hysteria over white slavery served to defuse the cognitive
dissonance between the values of civilized morality and the increasingly
open sexuality of America's young women. It provided a facile
explanation for why the daughters of virtuous parents were engaging in
"deviant" behavior. And most importantly, the hysteria placed the blame
for the enslavement of virtuous women on dark, powerful forces in turn-
of-the-century America: foreigners, the corrupting power of urbanism, and
wage slavery capitalism.
B. Legal Change and Societal Conceptions of the Prostitute
The reconceptualization of the prostitute as "victim" had profound
implications for the red-light district. In contrast to the Otherness of the
fallen woman, the white slavery victim shared a common solidarity with
those outside of the red-light district. The fallen woman had stood apart
from the world of civilized morality and was a creature against whom
women could measure their own morality. The white slavery victim, by
contrast, needed to be rescued from the vice district and returned to her
moral state. The white slave's victimhood allowed her to transgress the
boundary line that separated the vice district from civil society and
concomitantly permitted moral citizens to identify with women inside the
red-light district. These psychological movements across the boundary
line had an unintended effect - they altered the way civilized society
conceived of the segregated vice districts. Instead of defining the
parameters of civilized society, the red-light district was now viewed as a
pernicious jail in which the white slavery victims were "inmates."2 1
Those who operated the "jail" - the white slave traders, pimps and brothel
owners - were now the Others against which civilized society would
define itself. It is not surprising that the two major pieces of vice reform
211. REPORT ON THE SOCIAL EVIL CONDITIONS OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, supra note 193, at 54.
212. See, e.g., Robert McMurdy, The Use of the Injunction to Destroy Commercialized
Prostitution, 19 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Scl. 513, 514 (1928-29) ("The inmates of the
[bawdy]house, seven in number, were American girls, but seventeen years old, and the patrons
exclusively Chinese."); Our Red Light Injunction Law Constitutional, 19 REFORM BULL. 1, 1 (1928)
(on file with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53) ("The investigators were openly solicited
for immoral purposes by the girl inmates as soon as they entered the house."),
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legislation to come out of the white slave era directly addressed these
groups. The Mann Act, passed in 1910, criminalized the white slave trade
by making it a federal crime to transport women across state lines for
"immoral purposes." '213 The Red Light Abatement laws used public
nuisance law to hold property owners accountable for the uses of their
buildings. The discursive shift wrought by the white slavery panic
signaled the end to the segregated vice district's precarious, quasi-legal
position. By the mid-1910s, the continued existence of red-light districts
had simply become anathema to many Americans - they were now viewed
as the "source of the white slave traffic." '2 14 Whereas status in the era of
the fallen woman had been defined by the boundary line that separated the
segregated vice district from civilized society, in the era of the white slave
status came to be defined in the struggle to destroy the segregated
district.215
213. LANGUM,supra note 188, at 3.
214. McMurdy, supra note 212, at 516.
215. That a relationship exists between legal change and society's discourse on the prostitute is
supported by a subsequent discursive shift in the social construction of the prostitute that occurred
when the United States entered World War I. As with the discursive shift from the fallen woman to the
white slave, this discursive shift ushered in another wave of anti-prostitution legislation. As Allan M.
Brandt has documented, the federal government became concerned that venereal disease would
hamper the effectiveness of the America's fighting forces. Recent experiences in Texas, where the
U.S. Army had mobilized 10,000 soldiers to rebuff border incursions by Francisco "Poncho" Villa,
had revealed the potential threat posed by prostitution and venereal disease. With soldiers flocking to
the red-light districts of San Antonio, Douglas and El Paso, infection rates among soldiers approached
thirty percent. In some camps, as many as 300 soldiers a day applied for chemical prophylaxis
treatment to ward off venereal diseases. The response to these concerns was to wage a war against
venereal disease, and implicitly, the prostitute. Eleven days after America's entry into the war, the
military created the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA). The CTCA's Social Hygiene
Instruction Division, under the direction of the ASHA, began an "educational" campaign that both
promoted sexual abstinence and dramatized the dangers of contact with prostitutes. The prostitute was
now reconceptualized as a contagion that threatened the security of the nation. The CTCA pamphlet,
Keeping Fit to Fight, wamed the troops: "WOMEN WHO SOLICIT SOLDIERS FOR IMMORAL
PURPOSES ARE USUALLY DISEASE SPREADERS AND FRIENDS OF THE ENEMY." The
pamphlet also included this explicit admonition: "Any man who joins his body with the body of a
prostitute or loose girl runs the risk of catching one of these terrible diseases." BRANDT, supra note
191, at 54-61. It was not long before the CTCA used its broad powers to incarcerate the "loose"
women who malingered around military bases. The CTCA ultimately imprisoned as many as 30,000
alleged prostitutes without benefit of trial, legal representation, or due process. CONNELLY, supra note
164, at 143. See also John G. Buchanan, War Legislation Against Alcoholic Liquor and Prostitution, 9
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 520, 528 (1918-19) (detailing expenditures to aid states in
the establishment of detention camps for the women).
This reconceptualiztion of the prostitute as a diseased Other provoked a surge of venereal disease
legislation throughout the United States. According to George E. Worthington of the ASHA, "The
years 1918 and 1919 were banner years for venereal disease legislation." During these two years, the
number of states requiring the reporting of venereal disease rose from seventeen to forty-three. Forty-
four states required compulsory examination of suspected persons and quarantine of those deemed to
be a menace to public health. George E. Worthington, Developments in Social Hygiene Legislation
from 1917 to September 1, 1920,6 J. Soc. HYGIENE 557, 565 (1920).
A fourth major discourse of the prostitute emerged in the 1970s. This discourse embraced a vision
of the prostitute as a "sex worker" and argued for the decriminalization of most prostitution laws. See,
e.g, Barbara Milman, New Rules for the Oldest Profession: Should We Change our Prostitution Laws?
3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1980). The sex worker discourse represents a de-moralized version of the
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C. Inadequacies of the Common Law
Although the white slave hysteria solidified an emerging consensus that
the red-light district had to be eliminated, accomplishing that task proved
quite difficult under the existing common law regime. Police graft and
political corruption, combined with a sincere fear that elimination of the
segregated vice districts would unleash crime on residential areas, meant
that abolitionists - for a time at least - did not have the support of public
officials in shutting down the red-light districts. Criminal law, even if
enforced, often proved inadequate since arresting the prostitute only
provided a temporary solution, and it did nothing to shut down the
bawdyhouses that were at the heart of the problem.
As for public nuisance actions against bawdyhouses, the case of Otis v.
Bireley illustrates how difficult it was to bring a public nuisance action
fallen woman - a woman possessing agency who has consciously and pragmatically chosen to pursue
the monies that can be gained through prostitution. If the fallen women is how most people have
traditionally viewed the prostitute, the sex worker discourse probably comes closest to how prostitutes
have viewed themselves.
The following typology delineates the attributes and characteristics of the four competing discourses
of the prostitute:
Fallen Woman White Slave Disease Spreader Sex Worker
Dominant Era 19 1h Century 1900-1917 1917-1925 1970s
Autonomy Possesses agency No agency Irrelevant Possesses
agency
Age Adult woman Young girl Irrelevant Adult Woman
Characteristics Promiscuous, diseased Innocent, pre-sexual Clever, feeble-minded Pragmatic
Public Conception Common prostitute: Victim Threat to national Independent
immoral, blameworthy, security Contractor
lacking respectability
Public Response Condemnation Rescue Incarcerate, Legalize
Quarantine profession
Legal Response Restriction of prostitution Mann Act, Red Light Venereal Disease laws Relaxation of
to segregated districts Abatement Laws criminal laws
This typology of the discursive shifts in the social construction of the prostitute should not be
construed as suggesting that one discourse completely displaced another. Rather, each discursive turn
added another layer to the increasingly complex (and confused) conception of the prostitute. Even in
the white slave era, vestiges of the fallen woman discourse continued to percolate throughout
Progressive literature. Consider, for example, the juxtaposition of these two discourses in the
descriptions of prostitutes made by a vice investigator for the City of Newark: "Pervert from choice,"
"Easily Led," "Low ideas, admits all forms of perversion," "Would be a good woman under different
circumstances," "Vain, hardened, ignorant," "Foolish and easily led, ignorant," "Bold, just starting to
be a professional." REPORT ON THE SOCIAL EvIL CONDITIONS OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, supra note
193, at 166-67. '
In spite of this over-layering effect, in certain periods, social consensus solidified around a
dominant (as opposed to a solitary) discourse. And it is during these periods of social consensus that
laws concerning prostitution have undergone the greatest transformations. The discourse of the white
slavery panic laid the foundation for the enactment of the Red Light Abatement laws and the Mann
Act. Likewise, dramatic developments in venereal disease law were connected to the WWI discourse
of the prostitute as a "disease spreader." By contrast, in periods where society has not embraced a
dominant conception of the prostitute, transformations in the law of prostitution have been more
diffuse and sporadic.
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under the common law of nuisance. In 1911, a certain Arthur Burrage
Farwell - a veteran of battles to enjoin saloons - conceived of the idea of
using the writ of injunction as a means of closing Chicago's principal red-
light district.216 With the help of attorney Robert McMurdy and the
Chicago Law and Order League, 217 Farwell planned his attack against the
vice district. Under Illinois law at the time, a nuisance action against a
bawdyhouse could be reached only by the proof of sights and sounds.2" 8 In
short, the complainant would have to show special injury. Through
connections not discussed in the sources, Farwell convinced the owner of
the Mid-night Mission, Philo A. Otis, to bring a public nuisance suit
against a neighboring bawdyhouse. Conveniently, only six feet separated
the two buildings, 9 which made it comparatively easy for Otis and his
tenants to allege special injury in their Complaint's Brief:
The two buildings have several of their windows directly opposite each
other, so that when the shades in the windows are raised the view from the
rooms of the defendant's building is very plain, especially so at night
when there are lights in the rooms. The actions of the prostitute girls in
their immoral relations with lewd men are in obtrusively plain sight and
the nuisance created by the conditions is unavoidable if complainant's
tenants look out their windows. During the heated season when the
windows are open for comfort, the lewd and obscene talk of the men and
girls in the defendant's building is very plainly heard and is very highly
objectionable to complainant's tenants. Complainant's premises are also
damaged in their lawful use by the drunken, boisterous and riotous
conduct of the occupants of the premises of the defendants, and by the
attempt of dissolute men to enter the premises of the complainant,
thinking it to be a house of like character with defendants' and others in
the neighborhood.220
In spite of weeks of careful preparation, the trial before the Illinois
Circuit Court proved anti-climactic. The defendants, Shirley L. Bireley
and her lessee, Cora Abbott, failed to appear in court, and the chancellor
221granted a temporary injunction.
The success against the Bireley property was bittersweet. As the
216. McMurdy, supra note 212212, at 514.
217. Handwriting at the top of Complainant's brief states: "Case brought by the Chicago Law and
Order League, July 2, 1912." See Brief for Complainant at 1, Otis v. Bireley (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1912) (on file
with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3,
Folder 2: Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17).
218. McMurdy, supra note 212, at 514.
219. Brief for Coimplainant at 1, Otis v- Bireley, supra note 217
220. Id. at 2; Bill of Complaint at 1, Otis v. Bireley (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1912) (both on file with Social
Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 2:
Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17). Seven "formidable" affidavits were also filed against the
defendants. A New Weapon Against Vice, 28 SURVEY 630,630 (1912).
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attorney for the complainant acknowledged, the special injury requirement
would make it difficult to repeat the successes of this case. "Probably no
other house in the district could have been closed by this means, as
evidence of sights and sounds could hardly have been obtained elsewhere.
The remedy, therefore, was limited. 2 12 Unless opponents of the red-light
district began to move into the district for the express purpose of bringing
public nuisance complaints - a proposal that I have never run across - the
common law posed formidable obstacles. In theory, public officials should
have been bringing public nuisance actions against the bawdyhouses.
These houses were per se public nuisances. But graft and concerns about
spreading crime to civil society led public officials to resist shutting down
the bawdyhouses. Similarly, in theory, individual citizens could bring
special injury actions, but few - if any - abolitionists lived in the red-light
district, making it virtually impossible to satisfy the common law
requirements. The Red Light Abatement law provided a way to escape this
dilemma. Similar to the Liquor Abatement laws, the Red Light Abatement
laws expanded the concept of "public official" to include every citizen
within a statutorily specified jurisdiction. Thus, if public officers would
not act, then citizens in their public capacity would. Once again, the
common law distinction between public and private collapsed as private
individuals assumed the power to enforce public rights and community
norms.
D. Why Iowa?
In 1909, an "obscure legislator" 223 named John B. Hammond, with the
assistance of the Attorney General, George Cosson, 22 4 secured passage of
the first Red Light Abatement law.225 This act became the model for
222. McMurdy, supra note 212212, at 515.
223. Id. at 516. Hammond may have been obscure at the time of the passage of Iowa's Red Light
Abatement law, but he went on to greater things. In 1928 he was Legislative Superintendent of the
National Civic League in Washington. Our Red Light Injunction Law Constitutional, supra note 212,
at 2.
224. Bascom Johnson, Comment, Injunction and Abatement Laws of Iowa and Nebraska, 1
(1915) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder I: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State
Laws, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
225. 1909 Iowa Acts ch. 214. Texas had passed a type of Injunction and Abatement law in 1907,
but it was considered to have been "somewhat imperfectly incorporated." WILLOUGHBY CYRUS
WATERMAN, PROSTITUTION AND ITS REPRESSION IN NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1931, at 23 n.2 (1932).
The continued survival of Texas' red-light districts up to World War I would seem to support
Waterman's assertion. See Campbell v. Peacock, No. 5521, at I (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (on file with
Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 2:
Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17) (alleging that the city officials of San Antonio have
acquiesced and consented to an informal red-light district); Jane Adams, The Illegal Houses in Our
Midst, BULL. No. 2 (n.d.) (on file with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota,
ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24) (citing the
continued existence of a segregated vice district in San Antonio); Humphrey, Prostitution in Texas:
From the 1830s to the 1960s, supra note 10, at 31 (noting that the red-light districts of Fort Worth,
Houston, El Paso, Galveston, San Antonio and Waco were not shut down until 1917); Humphrey,
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subsequent Red Light Abatement laws throughout the United States, 226
and it was Iowa's United States Senator William S. Kenyon who pushed
through Congress the District of Columbia's Red Light Abatement law.227
Similar to the state's Liquor Abatement laws, 228  Iowa's Red Light
Abatement law declared brothels and their contents to be public nuisances.
The statute gave any citizen of any Iowa county, any county attorney, and
any society, association or body incorporated under Iowa law, the right to
file a petition in a court of equity for a temporary injunction restraining the
owner, operator and agent of the brothel from further permitting or
maintaining its operation. If the evidence established that the property was
being used as a place of prostitution, then a permanent injunction was
granted for up to one year and a tax was assessed against the building.
Several factors likely contributed to Iowa being the site of the first Red
Light Abatement law. First, it was much more likely that the first Red
Light Abatement law would emerge from a state that had already enacted
a Liquor Abatement law. Second, Iowa had an elective judiciary. Third,
after Littleton v. Fritz, there were virtually no constitutional obstacles to
the enactment of the Red Light Abatement law in Iowa. In fact, the only
challenge to the law was based on a procedural technicality: The Speaker
of the House of Representatives never signed the bill.2 29 And lastly, the
Prostitution and Public Policy in Austin, Texas, 1870-1915, supra note 179, at 513 (observing that
prostitutes were not expelled from Austin's segregated vice district until 1913).
226. See, e.g., State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 147 N.W. 215, 217 (Neb. 1914) (noting that
procedural provisions of Nebraska's Red Light Abatement statute were taken from the Iowa law);
Respondent's Brief at 19, State ex rel. Zabel v. Grefig, 159 N.W 560 (Wis. 1916) (on file with Social
Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 2:
Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17) ("The Wisconsin law was copied from the Iowa, Nebraska
and Minnesota statutes"); Franklin Hichborn, California 's Fight for a Red Light Abatement Law, I J.
Soc. HYGIENE 6, 7 (1915) ("A bill based upon the Iowa Abatement Law was introduced in the
Assembly."); H.S. Hollingsworth, The Iowa Injunction Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 236 (1914) ("So signal has been the victory of the Iowa
Injunction law that many other states have taken up the issue and patterned bills after it."); Elmer A.
Wilcox, Legislation in Iowa Compared with the Law Proposed for the Suppression of Vice in Illinois,
3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926, 926-27 (1913) (noting similarities between Iowa and
Illinois statutes, with the exception of the omission of the $300 tax from the Illinois bill); Our Red
Light Injunction Law Constitutional, supra note 212, at 2 (asserting that the Iowa Red Light
Abatement law has served as the model for forty other states); Law Note, Resum6 of Legislation Upon
Matters Relating to Social Hygiene Considered by the Various States During 1914, 1 J. SOC. HYGIENE
93, 93-103 (1915) (revealing that the states of Kentucky, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, New
York and Massachusetts have based their Red Light Abatement laws on the Iowa Injunction and
Abatement law). For a counter-argument that Minnesota's Red Light Abatement law provided the
model, see infra note 256.
227. Hollingsworth, supra note 226, at 236.
228. See State ex. rel. English v. Fanning, 147 N.W. at 217 ("The principal features of
[Nebraska's Red Light Abatement] law have evidently been derived from the statute of the state of
Iowa providing for the suppression of the illegal traffic in intoxicating liquors .. "). See also Ascher
& Wolf, supra note 100, at 605 (asserting that the Red Light Abatement laws were "Modelled upon
the liquor laws which originated in Iowa ... ").
229. Brief for Appellant at 2, State ex rel. Hammond v. Lynch, 151 N.W. 81 (Iowa 1915) (on file
with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3,
Folder 2: Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17). In Hammond v- Lynch, the Iowa Supreme Court
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Midwest - specifically Chicago - was at the center of the white slavery
hysteria.230 Even before the publication of THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO,
several Chicago authors were the self-declared and widely recognized
"authorities" on the national anti-white slavery campaign.231 Although it is
difficult to speculate on the impact of proximity, it seems significant that
the first three states to adopt Red Light Abatement states - Iowa (1909),
Nebraska (1911), and North Dakota (1911) - were all located in the
Midwest.232 It is also worth noting that these three states were less urban
and had smaller (and newer) cities. Adoption of the Red Light Abatement
laws may have been more palatable in these states in comparison with
states with more deeply entrenched red light districts such as Illinois,
Louisiana and California.
III. THE WAR AT HOME:
SOCIAL REFORM GROUPS & THE RED LIGHT ABATEMENT LAWS
Baltimore, December 16-22, 1921233
It was the week before Christmas and both David Oppenheim 234 and
struck down the law as unconstitutionally ratified, but it was quickly re-enacted. This confusion over
the constitutionality of the Iowa law may partially explain why the ASHA relied upon Minnesota's
Red Light Abatement law for its model. Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra
note 159, at 233-34. Another source, however, indicates that Minnesota's version of the Red Light
Abatement law, codified as 1913 Minn. Laws, c. 562 § 1, was considered superior to the original Iowa
model. Hollingsworth, supra note 226, at 236-37 ("April 26, 1913, the Minnesota Red Light
Injunction and Abatement Law was passed by the legislature. While modeled for the major part after
Iowa's law, it has some improvements which commend it to other states, Social purity leaders highly
endorse it. Suffice to say that Iowa will make the necessary amendments to the law as it now is, and
that other states yet unorganized in the crusade against segregated and commercialized vice will adopt
a perfect measure.").
230. CONNELLY, supra note 164, at 114 (noting that Chicago and New York were the epicenters
of white slavery literature); Barnes, supra note 144, at 145 ("It was during the summer of 1907 that
Chicago was startled out of her usual attitude of indifference toward commercialized vice by a series
of shocking revelations, which indicated that our city was the center of a well organized traffic in
women, a very real white slavery market."); see also LANGUM, supra note 188, at 27; Lubove, supra
note 197, at 312.
231. LANGUM,supra note 188, at 27; CONNELLY,supra note 164, at 114-35.
232. Both Nebraska and North Dakota also had elective judiciaries. Hall, supra note 116, at 337-
38. The first state election of justices to six year terms on the North Dakota Supreme Court occurred in
1889. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, available at http://www.court.state.nd.us/History (n.d.).
233. Facts together with probable inferences taken from the Affidavits of David Oppenheim and
Lawrence Nops filed with State ex rel. Johnstone v. Nickel and State ex rel. Johnstone v. Wilson (cited
in Proceedings in Injunction and Abatement, 5 MD. Soc. HYGIENE SOc'Y BULL. 1, 9-17, 20-25
(1922)).
234. During World War 1, the U.S. Government set up the United States Interdepartmental Social
Hygiene Board (USISHB) to assist the military in its battle against venereal disease, and by relation,
prostitution. The relationship between the USISHB and private Progressive social reform
organizations was quite close. In 1920 David Oppenheim had been assigned by the ASHA to
investigate vice conditions in Baltimore. Shortly thereafter, he described himself in an affidavit as an
employee of the USISHB. Furthermore, although Oppenheim and Nops both worked for the USISHB,
the actual lawsuits filed against property owners were submitted by Alan Johnstone, an "Officer of the
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Lawrence Nops were away from home. Oppenheim had been in Baltimore
for some time. In May, 1920, he had left his home in Rockaway Beach,
Long Island. In December, 1921, he had been joined by Nops of
Washington D.C. Now both men found themselves standing amidst the
noise, heat and smoke of the Folly Cabaret on 731-733 East Baltimore
Street. They were discussing the business of the Cabaret with its owner J.
H. Nickel and his agent, Charles Sachs. Nickel and Sachs were telling the
men that the Cabaret was more than a burlesque theater - it also had a
hotel for lodging guests. During the course of their conversations, some of
the women in the cabaret came up to Oppenheim and Nops and proposed
to take the two men up to the hotel rooms for sex. There was Lucille, a 25-
year old peroxide blonde with brown eyes, sharp nose and white teeth.
And Ruth, a 26-year old brunette who wore a large black hat and a satin
dress with white lace bodice and had a scar on the index finger of her right
hand. Some of the women gave the men cards with their phone numbers:
"Lorretta- Madison 1419-J"; "Francis - Homewood 380-J."
Sometimes the two men would watch the burlesque shows. There was
erotic dancing with women shaking their busts and moving their stomachs
and hips in the imitation of sexual intercourse. There was a seduction
show where a man induced a woman to drink liquor and then took
advantage of her inebriated state by disrobing her. They watched her
standing there in "slippers and a thin flesh colored knitted garment that
clung to her figure as to imitate a nude woman the breast and crotch of
said woman and every line of her figure being visible." The shows lasted
for about 2 /2 hours, and all the while women solicited the men for
prostitution.
235
Maryland Social Hygiene Society, Inc." Proceedings in Injunction and Abatement, 5 MD. SOC.
HYGIENE SOC'Y BULL. 1,3-32 (1922).
235. This description of the burlesque shows comes from a February 1, 1922, visit of David
Oppenheim to the Folly Cabaret. See Affidavit of David Oppenheim, supra note 233. One can
reasonably assume that these types of shows also would have occurred during Oppenheim's December
visits to the Folly Cabaret. It is important to note that Baltimore's segregated red-light districts were
already closed by the time that Oppenheim and Nops began their investigations. According to a report
published by the Society for the Suppression of Vice of Baltimore City, the last remaining houses of
the red-light districts were closed on September 12, 1915. THE ABOLITION OF THE RED-LIGHT
DISTRICTS IN BALTIMORE 9 (1916) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and
Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota). See also Abraham
Flexner, Next Steps in Dealing with Prostitution, I J. SOC. HYGIENE 529, 533-34 (1915); Closing a
Vice District by Strangulation, 35 SURvEY 229, 229 (1915); Note and Comment, The Abolition of the
Red Light Districts in Baltimore, 2 J. SOC. HYGIENE 282, 282 (1916). What Opphenheim and Nops
were documenting was a second-wave of prostitution following the official closure of the red-light
districts. With the elimination of the bawdyhouse as a site of commercialized sex, the locus of
prostitution had switched to dual-use structures such as cabarets, hotels and apartments. The
Committee of Fifteen in Chicago observed a similar trend. In its 1925 report, the Committee was
fixated on the "cabaret situation." See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 8-9 (1925)
("During the last six months the cabaret situation in Chicago has become more or less alarming.
Certain information came to me regarding the immorality in many of the cabarets and I directed a
hasty survey which revealed the conditions to be worse than I had anticipated."). By 1929, the
Committee's use of the Injunction and Abatement law was focused primarily on apartments and
hotels. See [ANNUAL REPORT OF] THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 1929 ("Of these 342 resorts closed by
2004]
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On their last night out, Elizabeth Graff came up to the men and asked
them to come to her apartment. They had remembered Elizabeth from the
night before when she had solicited them at one in the morning outside the
Folly Cabaret. Although they had ignored her entreaties that time, tonight
they took the two mile trip with her to her apartment at 1070 West Fayette
Street. When they arrived, Elsie Wilson greeted them. Wilson told the
men that she owned the building and operated it as a rooming-house for
prostitutes. She also informed the men that it would cost them $5 per room
and $15 per woman to have sex with Elizabeth and her sister, Alberta.
Most historical accounts of the Progressive struggle against prostitution
tend to give scant attention to the Red Light Abatement laws.236 This
comparative silence on the subject is somewhat curious since Progressive
social reformers at the time considered it their "most effective weapon" in
the war against prostitution."' in a survey of city attorneys and librarians
in cities of over 30,000 people, over half the respondents listed the Red
Light Abatement laws as the most effective measure in the repression of
vice.238 And in 1952, Bascom Johnson considered the laws important
enough to rouse him out of retirement, at which point he reminded
American society of their effectiveness: "In writing this Inj. & Abat.
article it has occurred to me that it would be interesting and important to
stress the influence of the existence of such laws in eliminating and
keeping closed the Red Light Dists. 2 39 In part, this lack of interest in the
history of the Red Light Abatement laws may stem from the perception
that there is nothing compelling about the story: the laws were passed,
they worked, and the red-light districts disappeared. Even Thomas C.
Mackey, who wrote the only sustained historical work on the subject,
provides only a glimpse of the rich story of the Red Light Abatement laws
in his case study of the Houston red-light district. 4° For the most part,
action of the Committee in 1929, there were 171 in apartment buildings, 115 in flat buildings, 12 in
apartment hotels, 23 in hotels and 21 in detached houses.").
236. See MACKEY, supra note 20, at 124 ("Although the red light abatement acts have influenced
modem society, they have received only limited attention from researchers."). See, e.g., CONNELLY,
supra note 164, at 24; GILFOYLE, supra note 162, at 310 (1992); LANGUM, supra note 188, at 23-24;
ROSEN, supra note 166, at 29.
237. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 4 (1919) ("The Injunction and Abatement
Law has been the Committee's most effective weapon during the year just closed."). See also Illinois'
Abatement Law Held Constitutional, 37 SURVEY 173, 173 (1916-17) (stating that the Red Light
Abatement Law has "proved a formidable weapon for the suppression of disorderly resorts ... ").
238. Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice, supra note 138, at 37, 43. By comparison,
only twenty-five percent of the respondents listed law enforcement and less than seventeen percent
listed police vigilance as the most effective weapons.
239. Letter from Bascom Johnson to Paul M. Kinsie (before January 30, 1952) (ASHA, Legal
Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History
Archives, University of Minnesota). The fruits of Johnson's labor were published the same year. See
Bascom Johnson, Good Laws ... Good Tools: Injunctions and Abatements versus Houses of
Prostitution, supra note 18.
240. MACKEY, supra note 20, at 290-387.
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Mackey's work is focused on a legal analysis of the Red Light Abatement
laws. The narrow orientation of Mackey's work is the result of two
factors: As the first scholarly work on the subject, it was probably
necessary that Mackey address the fundamental legal issues presented by
the Red Light Abatement laws - their constitutionality and their
relationship to existing doctrines such as public nuisance law and
vagrancy. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Mackey did not address
the connection between the Red Light Abatement laws and the Liquor
Abatement laws or the challenge that these laws posed to the classical
legal public-private distinction. A second factor affecting Mackey's work
is his heavy reliance on legal treatises and case law. Although these
sources are singularly important for understanding developments within
juristic circles, they offer a relatively thin picture of how these laws
interacted with society.
The files of the American Social Hygiene Association provide a richer
understanding of the Red Light Abatement laws and their place in
American society. These sources, combined with the vice commission
reports and the Annual Reports of the Committee of Fifteen, permit a
more detailed assessment of the role that Progressive era reform groups
played in the promotion, legal defense and enforcement of these laws. The
sources also provide an important insight into Progressive era conceptions
of property relations.
In spite of the importance of these primary sources to the study of the
Red Light Abatement laws, they suffer from several limitations. First, they
are not neutral sources. Groups such as the American Social Hygiene
Association and the Committee of Fifteen were militantly opposed the
red-light districts. Consequently, both their perception of public support
for their cause and their depictions of opposing vice interests are probably
not representative of a typical person during this period. Similarly,
reliance on these sources distorts the debates between the supporters and
opponents of the Red Light Abatement laws. For the most part, the "vice
interests" are demonized in these sources. Without a balanced set of
sources, it is difficult to present an accurate rendering of the opposition
and their perspective on the new laws. Second, it is important to remember
that reform groups likely engaged in a bit of hyperbole. As the Annual
Reports of the Committee of Fifteen illustrate, these groups actively
solicited contributions.24' Given this financial incentive, it is reasonable to
assume that documents meant for public consumption overstated the
groups' successes and downplayed their failures. And lastly, these sources
present a gendered picture of the war against prostitution in the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century, women's
organizations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the
241. See, e.g, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 17 (1917) (featuring two pledge
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Young Women's Christian Association were the focal point of the Purity
Crusade against red-light districts.242 Over the course of the Progressive
period, however, these groups were taken over by male leaders.243 As a
result, a project based upon sources from the American Social Hygiene
Association and the Committee of Fifteen presents a male-centered
perspective of the war against prostitution.
Despite these source limitations, the two Progressive social reform
organizations that are the principal focus of this study present a
complementary picture of anti-prostitution efforts during the Progressive
era. By analyzing both a local and a national vice reform group, it is
possible to perceive the full spectrum of anti-prostitution work during this
period-from investigating alleged bawdyhouses to advising state officials
on which form of the Red Light Abatement law to adopt.
The Committee of Fifteen in Chicago was incorporated on May 3, 1911
to follow up on the work of the Chicago Vice Commission, the body that
had written THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO. 2" The focus of the Committee
of Fifteen's work was almost solely local. As discussed below, the
Committee waged a long and protracted struggle against both Chicago's
red-light districts and the city's political machine. By contrast, the
American Social Hygiene Association was a national organization based
in New York City. Incorporated in 1914, the ASHA resulted from the
merger of a leading purity group, the American Vigilance Association,
with a leading social hygiene group.245 Funded in part by John D.
Rockefeller,246 the ASHA consisted of five administrative divisions:
Public Information and Extension, Educational Measures, Family
Relations, Legal and Protective Measures, and Medical Measures.247 It
was from the Legal and Protective Measures division that the ASHA
engaged in a nation-wide effort to monitor, promote and defend the Red
Light Abatement laws.
A. Ground War in Chicago: The Story of the Committee ofFifteen
In its charter, the Committee of Fifteen stated that its purpose was "to
242. LANGUM, supra note 188, at 23-24. See generally PIVAR, supra note 174.
243. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN I (1913). All four officers of the
Committee of Fifteen were male and only three out of fifty directors were female.
244. Barnes, supra note 144, at 146; Illinois' Abatement Law Held Constitutional, supra note
237, at 173.
245. LANGUM, supra note 188, at 23.
246. Rockefeller was deeply involved in the war against prostitution. He was a major financial
contributor to the Committee of Fourteen of New York, the New York Social Hygiene Society, the
Bureau of Social Hygiene, and the American Social Hygiene Association. He also served as foreman
on a grand jury investigating white slavery in New York City. See GILFOYLE, supra note 162, at 305;
DAVID J. PIVAR, WOMEN, PROSTITUTION, AND THE "AMERICAN PLAN," 1900-1930, at 119-38 (2002);
WATERMAN, supra note 225, at 84-90; The Bureau of Social Hygiene, 103 OUTLOOK 287,287 (1913).
247. WATERMAN, supra note 225, at 87.
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aid the public authorities in the enforcement of all laws against pandering
and to take measures calculated to suppress the 'white slave' traffic. ' 48
During its first three years in existence, the Committee sought to prod city
officials into action. For example, in the summer of 1913, the Committee
collected evidence of lax police enforcement against five bawdyhouses
that were known to harbor young girls. Confronted with a police captain
who said he was powerless to close them, the Committee sent a letter to
Mayor Harrison demanding an explanation. Without waiting for any
further proof, the Mayor ordered the Chief of Police to close the five
houses.
2 49
It soon became clear, however, that the Committee of Fifteen was
actually waging war against the city's public officials. With each report
that the Committee sent to the Mayor listing known bawdyhouses, the
implicit allegation of police corruption became stronger and stronger. The
refusal of the Mayor to hold the heads of the Police Department
accountable for these lapses signaled to the Committee that the Mayor was
in the grip of the commercialized vice interests.25° In the fall of 1913, the
Committee sent a widely-published "war note" to the Mayor demanding to
know who controlled the city: "The people of Chicago have a right to
know whether they are really under the rule of an invisible government
which controls the city in the interests of commercialized vice, and
whether you, their chief magistrate, intend to take proper action in regard
to such matters. '25' During this time, the Committee put further pressure
on the Mayor by submitting more lists of disreputable houses with the
knowledge that these lists would be published in the press. 252 The political
power struggle between the Mayor, the police and the Committee of
Fifteen was never entirely resolved. Instead, the Committee turned to
enactment of the Red Light Abatement law as a means of circumventing
these recalcitrant public officials.
The struggle to pass Illinois' Red Light Abatement law took four
years. 253 It was only in the last year of the struggle, 1915, that the
Committee of Fifteen threw its full weight behind the measure:
During several sessions of the Legislature, attempts were made to
248. Barnes, supra note 144, at 146.
249. ANNUAL RErORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 2-3 (1913).
250. Barnes, supra note 144, at 153.
251. Id. at 154.
252. Id. at 152, 154-55 ("The publicity campaign actually seems to have met with some success.
In response to seeing their names and properties in the paper "one of the most reputable of the real
estate agencies cancelled 38 leases within a few days; another twenty-four, and hundreds, of whom the
Committee heard indirectly, took similar action. Several of the large trust companies, handling real
estate investments, employed a strong staff of special detectives to investigate their property in
different parts of the city, and before the year was up it became almost impossible for a person of
questionable character to rent a house or apartment belonging to a reputable owner.").
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secure the passage of an Injunction and Abatement bill, but without
success. A year ago last winter, the Committee decided to take a strong
stand in advocacy of the measure and your Superintendent [Samuel P.
Thrasher]... was authorized to do his utmost endeavor to secure the
passage of that bill.255
Not only was the Committee of Fifteen credited with securing the
enactment of Illinois' Red Light Abatement law, 256 but it was among the
first groups to use it. As a result, Samuel P. Thrasher was the named
appellee in the only challenge to the law's constitutionality.257
The Annual Reports of the Committee of Fifteen provide a detailed
description of how one prominent vice reform organization used the
power of the Red Light Abatement law to win the war against segregated
vice districts. In its 1916 report, the Committee of Fifteen explicated how
the passage of the Injunction and Abatement law had changed their anti-
prostitution strategy. Prior to the law's effective date on July 1, 1915, the
Committee of Fifteen had relied upon a shaming policy. The Committee
would publish the names of the owners of properties used for immoral
purposes in the hopes of either shaming the owners into taking control of
the properties or provoking the city officials into action.258 The policy had
some success, but it could do little against recalcitrant property owners if
city officials refused to act.259 The Injunction and Abatement law changed
that dynamic. After July 1, 1915, if owners refused to take measures to
end prostitution on their properties, the Committee of Fifteen could file a
bill with the court of equity to enjoin the property from further use as a
place of prostitution. Not only did the property owner face loss of use of
the property for up to one year, but he or she could be fined or taxed, and
the contents of the building could be sold to pay court and policing costs.
According to the Annual Reports, an action against a property could
involve as many as six steps. An action began with a visit to the property
by one of the Committee's investigators. If the investigator found
indications that the property was being used for prostitution, a more
254. Prior to becoming Superintendent of the Committee of Fifteen, Thrasher had been Secretary
and General Manager of the Law and Order League of Connecticut for eleven years. He was also the
author of the State Police Law of Connecticut. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 5
(1913).
255. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 4 (1917).
256. Barnes, supra note 144, at 155; Illinois' Abatement Law Held Constitutional, supra note
237, at 173; The Injunction and Abatement Law Held Valid by the Supreme Court, 1 (n.d.) (ASHA,
Legal and Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases,
1918-22, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota)
257. See People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 114 N.E. 31 (111. 1916). Brief and Argument for
Appellee on file with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal
Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 2: Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17.
258. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 3 (1916).
259- The Committee of Fifteen stated that "hundreds of houses of prostitution were closed as a
result of [the shaming] policy." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 3 (1916).
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thorough evidentiary investigation would ensue. In some cases,
investigators would seek the permission of neighboring apartment
dwellers to spy on the activities of reported places of prostitution.
260 For
those properties for which there was corroborating evidence of
prostitution, an informal notice was sent to the owner informing her that
the Committee possessed reports showing that the property was a site of
prostitution activity. The policy of informal notification emerged from a
1915 unanimous decision that property owners should have fair notice
before any legal action was taken.2 6' More than fairness, however,
motivated the Committee members. The Committee recognized that it
would be a waste of resources - given the laborious
262 and expensive 263
evidentiary record that would have to be established to prevail in an
injunction proceeding - to commence with a legal action without giving
the property owner an opportunity to rectify the problem. Based upon their
experiences in the pre-Red Light Abatement era, the Committee
understood that some property owners were simply unaware that their
properties were being used for illegal purposes. Knowledge of the
situation was sometimes sufficient to provoke the absentee landlord to
remove the existing tenants and terminate the building's use as a site of
prostitution. If moral suasion had been sufficient to get these absentee
landlords to act prior to July 1, 1915, the Committee had good reason to
believe that the legal powers provided by the Red Light Abatement law
would be even more persuasive.
As the following charts illustrate, the Committee was correct in its
assumptions. Based upon the Committee's numbers, informal notice was
successful in fifty-eight to ninety-three percent of the cases.
260. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 11 (1921).
261. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 3 (1916).
262. Describing the evidentiary burdens facing the Committee if it pursued an Injunction and
Abatement action, the Committee wrote:
No one should be misled. It is not so simple as it might seem from reading this brief statement-
In the first place, evidence must be obtained, evidence sheets read and analyzed, and the court
records checked off, in order to be prepared to meet every denial before action is taken, In every
case there are from four to a dozen or more evidence sheets. Assuming that there are but six
[injunction proceedings], it would require a careful analysis of more than one thousand reports.
In addition to this, new evidence must be obtained after the informal notice is sent. We
frequently check off all previous work to ascertain its effectiveness- We are also obliged to
obtain additional evidence after the formal notice has bee served before application is made for
an injunction.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 6-7 (1917).
263, The New York Civic League claimed that it spent "$1,000 in cash for witnesses in gathering
evidence and attending various terms of court, for lawyers fees, etc." in their successful struggle
against a single property - the Pastime Hotel. Our Red Light Injunction Law Constitutional, supra
note 212, at 2. The Committee of Fifteen also reported that its annual budget had risen from $3,000 in
1911 to $50,000 in 1921. One can assume that investigation work comprised a significant portion of
these increased costs. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 13 (1921).
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1916264 1917265 1918266 1919217 1920268
Places Investigated 6,300
Evidence Gathered 170 615
Informal Notice 205 119 270 137 204
Formal Notice 14 51 65 14 37




1921269 1922270 1925271 1927272
Places Investigated 11,041 6,890 8,097 7,202
Evidence Gathered 816 483 1,067
Informal Notice 208 87 251 226
Formal Notice 74 35 106 45




For property owners who were "careless and defiant", the Committee
would serve them with "formal notice" as required by the Injunction and
Abatement statute:
You are hereby notified that if the nuisance complained of is not by
you abated and wholly discontinued within a reasonable time after
the expiration of five such days, the undersigned, a citizen and
resident of the City of Chicago, will file a petition for a temporary
injunction and a bill in equity in the name of the People of the State
of Illinois, in a court of competent jurisdiction in Cook County,
perpetually to enjoin you and all persons from maintaining or
permitting the said nuisance, and from using or permitting to be used
said building, apartment, or place in which said nuisance is
264. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 5-6 (1916).
265 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 6 (1917)
266. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 7-8 (1918).
267. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 4 (1919).
268. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 6-7 (1920).
269. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 8 (1921).
270. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 3-4 (1922).
271. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 5 (1925).
272. THE COMMITTEF OF FIFTEEN, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SUPERINTENDENT ON
THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE 2 (1927).
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maintained, for any purpose for a period of one year.
273
If the property owner persisted in maintaining the property as a public
nuisance, the Committee applied for an injunction to close the building for
up to one year. However, it proved to be an exceedingly rare case in which
the Committee had to pursue injunctive relief against a property owner. In
no year for which we have data was it necessary for the Committee to
pursue more than seven temporary injunctions.
The statistics highlight the massive amount of investigation work
undertaken by the Committee of Fifteen. In 1921, the Committee of
Fifteen was investigating nearly 1,000 properties a month. Admittedly,
many of the Committee's investigations may have been superficial, but it
appears that the evidentiary gathering investigations were significant
endeavors. It is hard to imagine any organization - especially a private one
- undertaking such a mammoth enterprise.
Aside from the sheer size of the operation, it is worth pondering the
social implications of these statistics. Prior to the Red Light Abatement
laws, the common law afforded property owners a certain zone of privacy,
provided they did not harm their immediate neighbors or the public. With
the Injunction and Abatement law, the citizenry was deputized to fight
prostitution. The "public" - in the form of vice investigators - could now
pierce this zone of privacy. One only has to recall Bascom Johnson
walking the streets of San Francisco's Barbary Coast or David Oppenheim
and Lawrence Nops lurking in Baltimore's cabarets to realize that public
rights - at least in the sphere of commercialized vice - had eroded and
buried the oasis of private rights.
The Red Light Abatement laws also represented a staggering transfer of
heretofore public powers to private organizations and private citizens.
Private groups and citizens now had powers coterminous with law-
enforcement officials.274 Not only was the Committee of Fifteen acting as
a private anti-prostitution police force, but the Committee's efforts were
largely done without the support of city officials. Part of this lack of
cooperation was probably due to the Committee's public accusations of
police graft. 275 By 1919, there was evidence of a growing rift between the
Police Department and Committee. Whereas in the past the Chief of
Police had asked the Committee to serve notices under the Injunction and
Abatement law, by 1919, there were no further requests.
276 In its 1920
273. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 6 (1917).
274. Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 
232 ("While this
law increased the existing power of law-enforcing officials to wipe out such nuisances, 
it put the same
power into the hands of citizens.").
275. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 9 (1916) ("When policemen,
with and without uniform, calmly watch the vicious orgies take place in these 
amusement centers
without interfering, the neglect of official duty is painfully evident.").
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Annual Report, the Committee observed that no public official or
employee in the City of Chicago had yet applied for an injunction under
the Red Light Abatement law.277 From the point of view of the
Committee, this abdication of responsibility by the city's public officials
justified the Committee's assumption of public powers:
But why do we need a Committee of Fifteen when we have laws to
protect us, specific laws making it a crime to exploit women and to
use property for immoral purposes and men elected to public office
for the express purpose of enforcing these very laws? The answer is
that men fail in their duty, fail because of ignorance, fail because they
do not find a public sentiment that compels recognition, fail because
of political influence and pressure which keeps them from having the
courage of their convictions.278
Beginning in 1921, the State's Attorney office began to reign in this"unofficial law enforcement body." '2 79 In February of that year, the State's
Attorney entered into an arrangement with the Committee under which the
State's Attorney would send formal notices to property owners where the
evidence collected by the Committee satisfied him that immoral
conditions existed. 80 On the one hand, this arrangement lessened some of
the work-load on the Committee. On the other hand, the decision to
proceed with injunctions now passed through the State's Attorney office.
The experience of the Committee of Fifteen highlights another
interesting phenomenon about the Red Light Abatement laws: their
effectiveness was not commensurate with their use. On average, the
Committee only sought 4.5 temporary injunctions per year. And yet, the
Committee of Fifteen repeatedly praised the Injunction and Abatement
law as the Committee's most effective weapon in the war against
prostitution. As the statistics suggest, the threat of an injunction, either
through informal or formal notice, was enough to convince most property
owners to get out of the prostitution business. On the ground, this usually
resulted in the eviction of the current tenants, and by default, closed the
bawdyhouse. In the Annual Reports, the Committee downplays the
coerciveness of this process by presenting numerous letters from property
owners and real estate agents thanking the Committee for both alerting
them to the problem and helping them evict their immoral tenants. For
example, in one letter a Mr. Granert writes, "I have your letter of the 8 th
inst., and have advised my real estate agent to have premises at ....
vacated at once, as I prefer to have it empty than to have tenants of that
277. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 2 (1920).
278. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 13 (1921).
279. Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice, supra note 138, at 19.
280. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 13 (1921).
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nature."28' Likewise, the First Trust and Savings Bank thanked the
Committee for helping them "get rid of so undesirable a tenant" and then
assured the Committee that the Bank was "anxious to comply with the
Committee's recommendations at all times."
282 It is quite possible that
some property owners were genuinely appreciative of the Committee's
efforts, or at least saw the Committee as a cheap means for evicting
undesirable tenants.283 One suspects, however, that the Committee was
putting a pleasant spin on a fairly coercive situation. Assuming that the
Progressives were right about the vast profits generated by
commercialized vice, it is hard to imagine that property owners - who
must have been sharing in a portion of those profits - were pleased about
the Committee's efforts. Nevertheless, there was little property owners
could do about the Committee's unwelcome intrusion into their lives.
Since resistance was futile, property owners probably made the best of a
bad situation. By cooperating with the Committee property owners
realized that they could avoid the total loss of seeing their properties
closed for a year under a permanent injunction.
The experience of the Committee of Fifteen also offers perspective on
some initial expressions of pessimism about the efficacy of the Red Light
Abatement laws. In an article published in 1913, Elmer A. Wilcox
remarked that the Iowa law was not used much.
284 Wilcox suggested that a
lack of anti-prostitution private organizations might account for the dearth
of activity in Iowa.285 Bascom Johnson, in his job as Assistant Counsel to
the ASHA, reached similar conclusions in regard to both Iowa and
Nebraska: "It is probably safe to say that the injunction law has been used
by the law-enforcing officials in these two States in not more than ten
percent of the cases in which raids have been made on buildings in which
prostitution was carried on. ' 286 Johnson cited three reasons for the law's
lack of use: lack of cooperation between the Police Departments and the
offices of the County Attorney; the failure of the public to conceive of the
property owner as an undesirable citizen; and lastly, hostility to the
campaign to extinguish the red-light districts.
287 Johnson was careful to
note, however, that none of the law-enforcing officials with whom he
281. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 8 (1920).
282. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 8 (1920).
283. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 11 (1918) ("Thanks for letter 
of
fourth instant about No. - Street, which has reached me here. I am moving 
at once to stop
evil conditions, but it may perhaps be necessary presently to ask your aid by injunction 
against
tenant.").
284. Wilcox, supra note 226, at 927.
285. Id.
286. Bascom Johnson, Comment, Injunction and Abatement Laws of Iowa and Nebraska, supra
note 224, at 6.
287. Id. at 8-9. Although Johnson perceived hostility to the enforcement of the Red 
Light
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talked thought the Red Light Abatement laws were ineffective or
impracticable. 88
Johnson based his negative assessment of the law's impact on the
records of fifty-two injunction and abatement cases brought before the
courts of Des Moines, Omaha and Lincoln. Johnson's figures are
reproduced in the following chart:289
Des Moines Lincoln Omaha Tot
1909-14 1911-14 1911-14
Formal Notice: Occupants 10 12 22 44
Formal Notice: Owners 10 6 28 44
Temporary Injunction: Occupants 5 11 5 21
Temporary Injunction: Owners 2 1 5 8
Permanent Injunction: Occupants 2 8 4 14
Permanent Injunction: Owners 1 1 4 6
Property Closed for I year 0 1 1 2
Personalty sold for costs 0 2 1 3
Violations of Injunction 0 1 0 1
Occupants move out 6 11 23 40
Upon first impression, the numbers do seem to bear out the laments of
Wilcox and Johnson. This chart, however, is deceptive because it only
accounts for actions that acquired legal formality. Thus, the chart fails to
calculate the non-legal impact of the Red Light Abatement laws. As the
statistics from the Committee of Fifteen demonstrate, much of the law's
effectiveness occurred outside the legal system - through informal notice,
the physical presence of investigators on the streets, and probably a
growing sense among property owners that the days of the red-light
district were numbered.
The development of "fill-in-the-blank" forms also may have made the
process of initiating Injunction and Abatement actions easier. In the
ASHA files are fill-in-the-blank forms from Hennepin County, Minnesota,
Marion County, Indiana and Multnomah County, Oregon.29 ° These forms
288. Id. at 7.
289. Id. at 4.
290. MODEL FORMS, DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, HENNEPIN COUNTy (c.1918)
(ASHA, Legal and Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court
Cases, 1918-22, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota), MODEL FORMS, IN THECOURT OF MARION COUNTY (1916) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 2: Injunction and
Abatement, Cases, 1912-17, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota); MODEL
FORMS, IN THE CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH (1919) (ASHA,
Legal and Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases,
1918-22, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
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cover every step in the legal process from the Complaint to the Writ of
Temporary Injunction and Abatement. Even if few cases ever reached the
point of requiring equitable relief, these forms likely would have
facilitated the commencement of legal actions and increased the pressure
against property owners.
Indirect evidence also supports the contention that the Red Light
Abatement laws had a greater effect than either Johnson or Wilcox
suspected. In 1912, John B. Hammond, the author of Iowa's Red Light
Abatement law, related an anecdote between a real estate agent and a
tenant to illustrate how the law had impacted the rental market:
I was in a real estate office and a gentleman came in, a stranger, and
he asked Mr. Coates, a real estate man, about property he had for rent
in Highland Park. "Yes," he said, "I have that property for rent."
"What do you rent it for?" "Fifteen dollars a month." "I do not
believe I can do any better than that; I believe I will take it." "What is
your name, where do you come from, who do you represent, what is
your business?" "My name is John Jones: I am a machinist." "Can
yeu give me some recommendations from the people you work for
down there?" Jones replied: "I am going to pay for my rent in
advance. What has that got to do with it?" "Well," he says, "you see
it is this way: That property is located next to a Professor Gordon of
the Highland Park College, and if I should be careless and let people
in there who had a disorderly house [i.e., a bawdyhouse or saloon] he
would have an injunction against me inside of three days. I have got
to see that Professor Gordon has decent neighbors."
'29
The closure of all of Iowa's red-light districts by 1914292 provides a
further indication that the state's Red Light Abatement law was more
effective than some had thought.293 H.S. Hollingsworth, the General
Secretary of Associated Charities in Des Moines, credited their closure to
the Red Light Abatement law.
2 94
The impact of the Red Light Abatement law on the formal legal system
was relatively minor. Equity courts were not swamped with thousands of
bills for injunctions. To measure effectively the impact of these laws one
has to examine how these laws altered, oftentimes coercively, the norms
291. John B. Hammond, Address, 2 VIGILANCE 1, 17(1912).
292. Hollingsworth, supra note 226, at 236.
293. Some reports probably gave a little too much credit to the Red Light Abatement law. Wirt
W. Hallam contended that the impact of the law in Iowa was instantaneous: "The result was that the
day after the laws in regard to the social evil went into effect cities which had had open houses of
prostitution for fifty years found them closed; and shortly afterward it was claimed that there was not
an open house of prostitution in the State of Iowa." Hallam, supra note 148, at 112-13. One suspects
that if the impact of the Red Light Abatement law had been that dramatic, neither Johnson nor Wilcox
would have questioned its efficacy.
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of property relations. A type of laissez-faire landlordism that had been
acceptable prior to the enactment of these laws was no longer tolerated.
The ground war against the segregated vice district not only closed the
district, but also raised the standards of accountability for property
ownership. Appropriately, John B. Hammond expressed this new social
norm in the conclusion to his address before the City Council of Chicago:
"And today if any man goes down to a real estate man and inquires for
property he is inquired of minutely as to what he is going to do with the
property. The law holds a property owner responsible for the acts of his
tenants."295
B. The ASHA on the Offensive: Promoting the Red Light Abatement Laws
The legal files of the American Social Hygiene Association paint a
vivid picture of how the ASHA acted as a self-appointed legal counsel for
vice reform legislation during the Progressive period. In regard to the Red
Light Abatement law, the legal files reveal how the ASHA monitored,
promoted and shaped a state-by-state campaign on behalf of these laws.
Contemporary observers credited the ASHA with bringing local vice
reform activities under a national umbrella: "With the co6rdination of
these [local] activities in the American Social Hygiene Association, a
concerted program of action along educational, medical and law
enforcement lines was definitely launched and carried into effect.
29 6 If
local groups such as the Committee of Fifteen bore the burden of
implementing these laws, it was the ASHA that furnished the centralizing
structure for a national war against the segregated vice district.
From early on in its existence, the ASHA developed model laws in
order to regularize the state enactment of Red Light Abatement laws. In
fact, the first model Red Light Abatement law was published by the
ASHA's predecessor, the American Vigilance Association. 297 By 1915,
the ASHA was promoting its own "Standard Form" of the Red Light
Abatement law in the Journal of Social Hygiene.298 Although not
explicitly stated in the legal files, the ASHA's development of a standard
form appears to have been driven by at least three motivations. First, the
ASHA recognized that adherence to a model law could insulate the laws
from constitutional challenges. By 1915 the Red Light Abatement laws
had faced constitutional challenges in three states - Minnesota,299
295. Hammond, supra note 292, at 17.
296. Joseph Mayer, The Passing of the Red Light District - Vice Investigations and Results, 4 J.
Soc. HYGIENE 197, 197 (1918); Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice, supra note 138, at
10.
297. American Vigilance Association, Injunction and Abatement Law, 13-19 (c.1913) (ASHA,
Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws, Social
Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
298. Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 233-39.
299. State ex rel. Wilcox v. Gilbert, 147 N.W. 953 (Minn. 1914); State ex rel. Robertson v. Lane,
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Nebraska300 and Washington. 30' The challenges involved due process and
equal protection claims, assertions of the right to a jury trial, and
impairment of the obligation of contracts. In each of these states every
section of the Red Light Abatement laws had been upheld, with one
exception. In Nebraska, the Supreme Court had struck down the $300 tax
provision - section 13 in the ASHA standard form - as a "clear and
palpable violation" of the Nebraska constitution.1 2 As early as 1914, the
editors of the California Law Review were declaring the constitutionality
of the laws "well settled. 30 3 The ASHA recognized that a standard form
based on the Red Light Abatement laws of these states would be able cite
to these favorable precedents. Over time, assuming more states declared
the ASHA Standard Form constitutional, the weight of precedent would
grow even stronger. And this is precisely what happened. In 1920, the
constitutionality of Georgia's Red Abatement Law was challenged. In
upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Supreme Court cited that
fact that Georgia's statute was substantially similar to the statutes in thirty-
eight other states, and that seven of these states had already upheld the
constitutionality of their respective Red Light Abatement laws.304 Second,
the ASHA wanted to accelerate the passage of the Red Light Abatement
laws. By generating a model law, the ASHA saved state legislatures from
the laborious task of creating the law from scratch. To expedite passage of
the laws, the ASHA recommended that "Before this form is introduced as
a bill, it should be carefully examined by an attorney in the state
concerned, in order that such changes may be made therein as will bring
them into harmony with the legal usage and procedure in that state."30 5
And lastly, the similarities in laws allowed enforcement experiences in
one state to be transferred to other states.
In addition to charting periodically the adoption of vice reform laws in
each state,306 the ASHA conducted a national state survey of each state's
147 N.W. 951 (Minn- 1914).
300. State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 147 N.W. 215 (Neb. 1914).
301. State ex rel. Kern v. Jerome, 141 P. 753 (Wash. 1914). As noted earlier, see supra note 256,
there had been no substantive challenge to Iowa's Red Light Abatement law.
302. State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 147 N.W. at 217.
303. Comment, Constitutional Law: Validity of "Red Light Law ": Taxation, 2 CAL. L. REV. 498,
499(1914).
304. Williams v. State ex rel. McNulty, 104 S.E. 408,409 (Ga. 1920).
305. STANDARD FORMS OF LAWS, FORM No. 3, at l (n.d.) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2,
Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota).
306. See, e.g., George Gould, Laws Against Prostitution and Their Use, 27 J. SOC. HYGIENE 335,
341, 342-43 (1941) (including a visual map of the United States with four different shadings to reflect
differing degrees of vice legislation and a chart listing the state-by-state adoption of sixteen different
anti-prostitution laws); Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 231
(containing fold-out chart listing the states that adopted the Red Light Abatement law and describing
the particular elements of the laws); Worthington, Developments in Social Hygiene Legislation from
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Red Light Abatement laws in 1921. The ASHA used its Standard Form,
now named "Standard Form No. 3" as a basis for analyzing and critiquing
state laws.307 For example, in its analysis of Arizona's law, the ASHA
noted, "The law of this state differs from the model form number 3 in
several particulars. The most important difference is that the Arizona law
does not contain that portion of section 4 of the standard providing for the
issuance of an urder restraining the removal of personal property from a
building. 30 8 Kansas' law was deemed so inadequate that the ASHA
recommended passage of a new law based on Standard Form No. 3, or its
equivalent, the revised Iowa Abatement Law of 1915.309 In the cases of
South Carolina and Utah, the ASHA recommended that the two states
delete the notice provision in their Red Light Abatement statutes.310
During the period 1925-53, the ASHA developed a memorandum form for
proposed anti-prostitution legislation. By this time, there were eleven
different laws against prostitution. The form provided blank spaces to
indicate where additional legislation was needed in that respective state.311
Evidence of the ASHA's role in assisting states in the passage of their
Red Light Abatement laws can be gleaned from two letters between the
ASHA and the West Virginia Bureau of Venereal Disease. In 1925, the
ASHA helped the Bureau of Venereal Diseases in the preparation of the
state's Red Light Abatement law.3 12 One issue, in particular, appears to
different anti-prostitution laws); ASHA, State and Federal Laws Concerning White Slave Traffic,
Keeping Disorderly Houses and Age of Consent (1916) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder
15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota)
(listing states and ranking the quality of their laws); ASHA, State Laws Against Prostitution (1944)
(ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare
History Archives, University of Minnesota) (containing a visual map of the United States with four
different shadings to reflect differing degrees of vice legislation); Letter from Miss Raybum to Miss
Stiller (January 8, 1944) (including draft charts of state-by-state adoption of prostitution laws with
corrections by George Gould) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and
Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
307. See also Law Note, R~sumi of Legislation Upon Matters Relating to Social Hygiene
Considered by the Various States During 1914, supra note 226, at 93-103 (providing a description and
analysis of the various Red Light Abatement law provisions in eleven states).
308. ARIZONA INJUNCTION AND ABATEMENT LAW (1921) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3,
Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota).
309. IOWA CODE § 4944h, 1-11 (1915); KANSAS INJUNCTION AND ABATEMENT LAW (1921)
(ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws,
Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
310, SOUTH CAROLINA INJUNCTION AND ABATEMENT LAW (1921); UTAH INJUNCTION AND
ABATEMENT LAW (1921) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement,
1913-31, State Laws, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
311. FORM FOR PROPOSED ANTI-PROSTITUTION LEGISLATION (n.d.) (ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota).
312. See Letter from Ada C. McDermott to the American Social Hygiene Association (January
13, 193 1) ("A few years ago your division assisted this bureau in the preparation of an injunction and
abatement measure, copy enclosed herewith, which was passed in the 1925 legislature.") (ASHA,
Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History
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have troubled the West Virginia legislature - the $300 tax provision. To
assist the Bureau in defending the tax provision, the Acting Director of
ASHA's Legal Measures Department sent the Bureau a letter. The bulk of
this letter consisted of a long excerpt from State ex rel. Kern v. Jerome,31
3
the Washington state case upholding the constitutionality of the tax.314 In
1931, the tax issue surfaced again. A "Reviser's Note" to the West
Virginia code omitted a portion of the $300 tax section on public policy
grounds because it was feared that the tax gave salaried officers a financial
stake in the enforcement of the law.315 At some point, the ASHA also
appears to have abandoned its efforts to defend the controversial tax
provision, since it was eventually deleted from the ASHA's Standard
Form.316
The ASHA's national role in the war against commercialized vice
received a further boost with the quasi-federalization of anti-prostitution
legislation during the First World War. During the war, the law
enforcement division of the Commission on Training Camp Activities
(CTCA), which was comprised of prominent members of the ASHA,317
took it upon itself to harmonize state prostitution laws.3 18 The CTCA was
concerned about the absence of a single criminal standard for acts of
prostitution. In some states, the male customer could not be prosecuted. In
other states, only sexual intercourse "for hire" was considered prostitution.
The CTCA used its position as a federal agency to draft the so-called
"Vice Repressive Law," or Standard Form No. I and then presented it to
the state legislatures for enactment. 319  The Vice Repressive Law
criminalized both parties to the act of prostitution and defined prostitution
Archives, University of Minnesota).
313. 141 P. 753 (Wash. 1914).
314. Letter from George E. Worthington to Ada L. Coddington (May 22, 1925) (ASHA, Legal
Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History
Archives, University of Minnesota).
315. Letter from Ada C. McDermott to the American Social Hygiene Association, supra note
312.
316. STANDARD FORM OF INJUNCTION AND ABATEMENT ACT 5 (1945) (ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota).
317. See WATERMAN, supra note 225, at 88 ("During the World War the American Social
Hygiene Association was an active and effective adjunct to the Military. The men who have been
largely responsible for creating and directing the policies of the Association, including Dr. William F.
Snow the General Director, were commissioned to administer the educational and repressive program
inaugurated by the National Government to protect the enlisted men from venereal infections."). The
Social Hygiene Instruction Division was under the direction of the ASHA's Dr. Walter Clarke. See
BRANDT, supra note 191, at 61. Other members of the ASHA who served in the CTCA were Lt. Col.
William F. Snow, General Secretary of the ASHA, and Major Bascom Johnson, Assistant Counsel of
the ASHA. During the war Major Johnson held the title of Director of the Division of Law
Enforcement, War Department Commission on Training Camp Activities. See Buchanan, supra note
215, at 522; Mayer, The Regulation of Commercialized Vice, supra note 138, at 9.
318. Worthington, Developments in Social Hygiene Legislation from 1917 to September 1, 1920,
supra note 215, at 561.
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as broadly as possible: "[T]he term "prostitution" shall be construed to
include the giving or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire,
and shall also be construed to include the giving or receiving of the body
for indiscriminate sexual intercourse without hire."32 By 1920, eleven
states had adopted the Vice Repressive Law.3 21 In 1919, the CTCA drafted
a Model Venereal Disease Law, or Standard Form No. 4.322 It was adopted
by sixteen states in 1919 and one state in 1920.323
Although the ASHA tried to portray these laws as "the
recommendation[s] of the Federal Government, "324 and "publication[s] of
the CTCA,"32 the role of the ASHA in their creation is quite clear. The
ASHA publicly acknowledged that copies of the Standard Forms could be
secured on application to the ASHA's offices in New York City.326 As
early as 1920, the Association was publishing a Social Hygiene
Legislation Manual, which included the Standard Forms.327 The scope of
the ASHA's role is further illuminated in an exchange of letters between
Dr. Walter Clarke and Bascom Johnson. In the letters, the two heads of the
ASHA's legal division debated whether to destroy the Association's stock
of 2,810 copies of Standard Form No. 4.328 That the ASHA would have so
many copies of this law provides some indication that the Association
anticipated playing a major role in the promotion of the Model Venereal
Disease Law. Ultimately, the two men determined that portions of the law
had become obsolete in the intervening ten years.3 29 All but ten of the
320. Id. at 338.
321. Bascom Johnson, Law Enforcement Against Prostitution from the Point of View of the Public
Official, 9 NAT'L MUN. REv. 427,429 (1920). See also Worthington, Developments in Social Hygiene
Legislation from 1917 to September 1, 1920, supra note 215, at 561 (reporting that the law was
"passed in ten states and as to some of its provisions in two others.").
322. Id. at 566.
323. Id,
324. Bascom Johnson, Law Enforcement Against Prostitution from the Point of View of the Public
Official, supra note 321, at 429.
325. Worthington, Developments in Social Hygiene Legislation from 1917 to September 1, 1920,,
supra note 215, at 563 n,17.
326. Id. at 563 n.17, 566 n.39; Bascom Johnson, Law Enforcement Against Prostitution from the
Point of View of the Public Official, supra note 321, at 429 n. 1.
327. SOCIAL HYGIENE LEGISLATION MANUAL (1920) (ASHA, Legal and Protective Measures,
SW 45, Box 6, Folder 1: Legal Reference Files, Publications, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota).
328. Letter from Bascom Johnson to Dr. Clarke (July 11, 1929) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files,
Box 4, Folder 6: Prostitution, 1912-29, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
329. See Letter from Dr. Clarke to Bascom Johnson (July 16, 1929) (ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 4, Folder 6: Prostitution, 1912-29, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota) ("It seems to me doubtful whether this is the form of law we want to promulgate,
especially pp 4"); Letter from Dr. Clarke to Bascom Johnson (July 17, 1929) (ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 4, Folder 6: Prostitution, 1912-29, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota) ("Yes. I agree to the destruction of No. 4 on ground that parts of it are obsolete."). Johnson
and Clarke were particularly concerned about the administrative scheme laid out in the law. In the
original law, the treatment of criminals with venereal disease was placed in the hands of the Health
Department. By 1929, both men thought that the responsibility for treatment should be vested in the
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copies were ordered destroyed.330
The legal files of the ASHA provide a glimpse of how one private
Progressive reform organization was able to impose order on state
legislation during this period. Instead of a chaotic diversity of anti-
prostitution laws, the ASHA quickly developed standard forms and then
shopped these forms to the various state legislatures. States without the
standard form were encouraged to adopt it, and states whose laws
diverged from the standard form were advised to conform to the model.
As a result of the ASHA's efforts, the Red Light Abatement laws were
strikingly uniform across the different states. They were "national" laws in
spite of their state origins. The experience of the ASHA illustrates how
private groups could "federalize" American law prior to the expansion of
federal powers in the 1930s.
C. The ASHA 's Rear-Guard Actions: Defending the Red Light Abatement
Laws
The ASHA's role in nationalizing the Red Light Abatement laws also
made the defense of these laws easier. Instead of confronting a
multiplicity of different state statutes, the uniformity of the laws allowed
for the transfer of legal arguments across state lines. As early as 1915, the
ASHA was developing what might be referred to as a "Model Brief' in
support of the Red Light Abatement law. The Model Brief not only
facilitated defense of the Red Light Abatement laws, but also put pressure
on state legislatures to adopt the ASHA Standard Form.
It is important to note that the ASHA did not have a role in the initial
constitutional challenges to the Red Light Abatement laws. These early
cases from Nebraska, Washington and Minnesota provide a study in
contrasts. In the Nebraska and Washington cases, the Supreme Courts of
the respective states more or less adopted Iowa case law. In State ex rel.
Kern v. Jerome,331 the only cases cited by the Washington Supreme Court
are from the unsuccessful challenges to Iowa's Liquor Abatement law. 332
Similarly, in State ex rel. English v. Fanning,333 the Nebraska Supreme
Corrections Department. Letter from Bascom Johnson to Dr. Clarke (July 15, 1929) (ASHA, Legal
Reference Files, Box 4, Folder 6: Prostitution, 1912-29, Social Welfare History Archives, University
of Minnesota).
330. Letter from Bascom Johnson to Miss Noles (July 17, 1929) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files,
Box 4, Folder 6: Prostitution, 1912-29, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota)
("Reserve 10 and destroy the rest of No. 4 Model Law."); Letter from Bascom Johnson Mrs. Luce
(July 18, 1929) ("I have conferred with Dr. Clarke and we have decided that the supply of this Model
From (sic) can be destroyed with the exception of the usual ten for reserve.") (ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 4, Folder 6: Prostitution, 1912-29, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota).
331. 141 P. 753 (Wash. 1914).
332. Curiously, the Washington Supreme Court did not cite Littleton v. Fritz, although all the
cases mentioned in the case are its progeny.
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Court relied almost entirely on Iowa case law. In response to almost every
challenge to the statute, the Nebraska Court responded with a variation of
the same mantra, "This point has... been considered and determined by
the Iowa court., 334 The Minnesota Supreme Court, by contrast, defended
the constitutionality of its Red Light Abatement law solely on Minnesota
and U.S. Supreme Court cases. 33' Nor did the Brief of the Minnesota
Attorney General in State ex rel. Robertson v. Lane cite Iowa case law.
33 6
The ASHA Model Brief incorporated both of these strands of
argumentation. On the one hand, the Model Brief relied heavily upon Iowa
law. Of the thirteen sections in the original ASHA Standard Form, eleven
are supported by Iowa cases, with Littleton v. Fritz being the most cited
case.337 Other important Liquor Abatement law cases such as Carleton v.
Rugg and Mugler v. Kansas were also included in the Brief.338 On the
other hand, the Model Brief incorporated the two recent Minnesota
Supreme Court decisions and provided digests of these cases.
339
The Model Brief made defense of the Red Light Abatement laws
relatively simple. In the pre-adoption phase, proponents of the Red Light
Abatement laws could rely on the Brief to counter charges that the laws
were unconstitutional. Post-enactment, the Brief provided the backbone
for any constitutional challenge to the law. Of course, all this assumed that
the state legislature had adopted the ASHA Standard Form. The
juxtaposition of the Standard Form alongside the Model Brief may explain
some of the ASHA's success in nationalizing the Red Light Abatement
laws. By providing a complete package of both the law and the decisions
supporting its constitutionality, the ASHA facilitated the adoption of its
own Standard Form in the state legislatures.
The only serious challenge to the constitutionality of the Red Light
Abatement laws came in New Jersey. In Hedden v. Hand,34 a liquor
abatement case, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held that the
state's Injunction and Abatement law was unconstitutional. 4' Relying
334. State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 147 N.W. 215, 217 (Neb. 1914).
335. State ex rel. Robertson v. Lane, 147 N.W. 951 (Minn. 1914); State ex rel. Wilcox v. Gilbert,
147 N.W. 953 (Minn. 1914).
336. Brief for Respondent, State ex rel. Robertson v. Lane, 147 N.W. 951 (Minn. 1914) (on file
with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 3,
Folder 2: Injunction and Abatement, Cases, 1912-17).
337. Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 241-42.
338. Id. at 241-42. Two other frequently cited cases were Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray
(Mass.) 23 (1859)andDavis v. Auld, 53 A. 118(Me. 1902).
339. Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 241-47. Digests of
the Nebraska and Washington cases were also provided.
340. 107 A. 285 (N.J. 1919).
341. In the months leading up to Hedden there were indications that the New Jersey Courts did
not look favorably upon the state's Red Light Abatement law. In Rundall v. Hill, (N.J. 1918), the
Court dismissed an action against a property owner because it considered the evidence to be hearsay.
In 1919, the same case returned to court. This time, the court found that the Complainants had failed to
establish proof of ownership of the building's personalty. Without such proof, the court held, "[lit
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upon old English cases, the Court, in a sudden departure from trends in
public nuisance law, revived the criminal equity concern: "[T]he
legislation, in itself, is unconstitutional, in that it attempts to confer upon
the Court of Chancery jurisdiction of a subject-matter of a purely criminal
character.... It is idle to entertain the thought for a single moment that
the Legislature can change the nature of an offense by changing the forum
in which it is to be tried." '342 The Court observed that the Injunction and
Abatement law deprived defendants both of their rights to a grand jury
presentment and to trial by jury following indictment.343 In a letter to
Timothy N. Pfeiffer of the ASHA, the losing attorney, Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, ignored the Court's legal reasoning and attributed the
surprising outcome of the case to two other factors:
First, the original act applying only to disorderly houses was amended
to involve violations of the law concerning intoxicating liquors, and I
rather fancy that the amendment stepped upon the toes of a majority of the
court; secondly (and this seems to me to be the gist of the opinion) we had
to contend with the perennial jealousy of the Supreme Court judges (who
make up the majority of the Court of Errors and Appeals) of the growing
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.344
The ASHA was understandably concerned about the Court's holding in
Hedden. Until 1919, there had been a gathering weight of case law
supporting the constitutionality of these statutes. Now, opponents of the
Red Light Abatement laws could cite an opposing authority. But there was
more than just the outcome of the case that worried the ASHA. The
counsel for the Complainants-Respondents, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, had
relied upon the ASHA Model Brief in his Brief to the Court. The
Vanderbilt Brief was a mixture of New Jersey case law combined with
citations to the Model Brief. For example, in the section asserting that the
Injunction and Abatement law did not violate a defendant's right to trial to
cannot be known whether the owners of the property against which these injunctions are now
operative have had a day in court." Rundall v. Hill (N.J. Ch. 1919) (ASHA, Legal and Protective
Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases, 1918-22, Social Welfare
History Archives, University of Minnesota).
In a letter written shortly after the second Rundall decision, Attorneys for the Complainants
commented on the impact of the Court's decision. "It seems to us that the effect of the Vice
Chancellors (sic) ruling is to largely destroy the value of the act. It makes the point that it is necessary
to prove the ownership of the furniture in these houses before we can sustain an injunction against it.
We do not see how it is possible to obtain competent proof of this fact." Letter from Endicott and
Endicott, Counsellors at Law to Frederick H. Whitin (March 26, 1919) (ASHA, Legal and Protective
Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases, 1918-22, Social Welfare
History Archives, University of Minnesota).
342. Hedden v. Hand, 107 A. 285, 287, 291 (N.J. 1919).
343- Hedden v. Hand, 107 A. 285, 291 (N.J. 1919).
344. Letter from Arthur T. Vanderbilt to Timothy Newell Peiffer (sic) (October 11, 1919)
(ASHA, Legal and Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court
Cases, 1918-22, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota). The second point was
reiterated in a contemporary analysis of the case. See Note, New Jersey's Injunction and Abatement
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jury, because this guarantee was inapplicable to actions in equity,
Vanderbilt began with citations to New Jersey law and then concluded
with the following cases:
See also English v. Fanning, 147 N.W., 215; State v. Gilbert, 147
N.W., 953; Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass., 550; State v. Murphy, 71
Vt., 127; State v. Saunders, 66 N.H., 39; State v. Marshall, 100 Miss.,
626; Davis v. Auld, supra, 96 Me., 559; Littleton v. Fritz, supra, 65
Ia., 448 .
34 5
Not only are these almost the same cases as those in tenth section of the
ASHA Model Brief (only Mugler v. Kansas is omitted because it was
cited in the preceding sentence), but they are presented in exactly the same
order.3 4 6 Nor are these the only citations to the ASHA Model Brief. In
seven different sections of the Brief, Vanderbilt relied upon identical (or
nearly identical) citations to the ASHA Model Brief.34 7
In the wake of the Hedden decision, then-Major Bascom Johnson
345. Brief for Complainants-Respondents at 11, Hedden v. Hand, 107 A. 285 (N.J. 1919) (on file
with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal and Protective
Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases, 1918-22).
346. Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 241.
347. Brief for Complainants-Respondents at 4, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 24, Hedden v. Hand, 107 A. 285
(N.J. 1919) (on file with Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, ASHA, Legal and
Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases, 1918-22);
Bascom Johnson, The Injunction and Abatement Law, supra note 159, at 241-42. Vanderbilt relied
upon the following seven sections of the ASHA Model Brief:
II. State legislatures have power to declare such places to be nuisances. State vs. Beardsley, 108
Iowa 396. Com. vs. Howe, 13 Gray (Mass.) 26. Am. & Eng. Enc. vol. 21, p. 7 3 9 .
V. The fact that the law does not require knowledge of the unlawful use on the part of the owner
does not render it unconstitutional because the owner of the property is presumed to know the
business conducted thereon. Com. vs. Howe, 13 Gray (Mass.); Hodge vs. Muscatine County,
121 Iowa 482; 196 U.S. p. 276; State vs. Gilbert, digested infra, point 7; English vs. Fanning,
digested infra, point 5, and cases cited therein.
VI. Legislatures may confer the right to bring such actions upon a private citizen without
requiring him to bring special damages. English vs. Fanning, digested infra, point 4; Littleton
vs. Fritz, supra; Davis vs. Auld, supra.
VIII. The constitutional requirement of due process of law is fulfilled as to each defendant who
is made a party to the suit and receives notice and a hearing. Littleton vs. Fritz, supra; State vs-
Jordan, 72 Iowa 377; Danner vs. Hotz, 74 Ia. 389; Shear vs. Green, 73 Ia. 688; English vs.
Fanning, digested infra, point 2; State vs. Gilbert, digested infra, point 7.
X. Such laws are not unconstitutional as depriving defendants of the right to trial by jury
because such constitutional guarantee is "inapplicable to actions based upon equitable causes of
action." English vs. Fanning, digested infra point 2, and cases cited therein; State vs. Gilbert,
digested infra point 3, citing with approval Carleton vs. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550; State vs. Murphy,
71 Vt. 127; Mugger (sic) vs. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; State vs. Saundes, 66 N.H. 39; State vs.
Marshall, 100 Miss. 626; see also Davis vs. Auld, supra; Littleton vs. Fritz, supra.
XII. Such laws are not penal nor do they constitute an attempt to enforce a criminal statute by a
civil action. Littleton vs. Fritz, supra; State vs. Gilbert, infra, point 4; Davis vs. Auld, supra.
XIII. The $300 tax is not penalty but a tax on the business and the imposition thereof by a court
of equity does not deprive a party of his property without due process of law. Hodge vs.
Muscatine County, 121 Iowa 482, affirmed by U.S. Supreme Court in 196 U.S. 276; State vs.
Gilbert, infra, point 4; State vs. Jerome, infra, point 3, but see contra English vs. Fanning, infra,
point 3.
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proposed an ASHA-organized conference with New Jersey backers of the
law to see what could be done to solve the New Jersey problem. Johnson
suggested either strengthening the criminal law under which public
nuisance may be abated or perhaps even sending another trial case through
the courts.348 If the conference was held, nothing seems to have come from
it.3 49 New Jersey remained without a Red Light Abatement law for most of
the 1920s and 1930s.
350
In the end, the ASHA's concerns over the Hedden decision were
unnecessary. No other states followed the New Jersey decision. In fact, the
Hedden decision did not even earn the respect of the federal judges in
New Jersey. In United States v. Reinking,35 1 a case upholding an
injunction to padlock a house where liquor was illegally sold, the district
court judge explicitly repudiated Hedden.352 Nor did the Hedden decision
garner much respect within the law schools. The editors of the Columbia
Law Review criticized the Hedden opinion for ignoring reality and
elevating legal formalism - what the editors derisively referred to as "the
technical rules of special damage" - above the health of its own
citizens. 3 "For although there is an adequate remedy at law in the
indictment and criminal abatement, actually, as a matter of common
knowledge, this agency has failed.
354
The negative response to Hedden is an indication of how far the
common law of public nuisance had traveled over the preceding forty
years. Had the Hedden opinion come down in 1880, it likely would have
met a more favorable reaction. By 1920, however, adhering to the
348. Letter from Bascom Johnson to William F. Snow (September 12, 1919) (ASHA, Legal and
Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases, 1918-22,
Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
349. Timothey N. Pfeiffer was appointed ASHA representative to the proposed conference, but
the ASHA legal files do not indicate if the conference was ever held and whether it made any
recommendations. Letter from William F. Snow to Timothy N. Pfeiffer (September 15, 1919) (ASHA,
Legal and Protective Measures, SW 45, Box 3, Folder 3: Injunction and Abatement, Court Cases,
1918-22, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
350. An internal ASHA memorandum indicates that the holding in Hedden had been whittled
away by two cases in the 1930s, State ex rel State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118
N.J. Eq. 504 (1935) (upholding constitutionality of a statute conferring on courts equitable jurisdiction
to restrain habitual violation of the State Board of Milk Control's regulations) and State ex rel. Board
of Health of Hillside Township v. Mundet Cork Corp., 126 N.J. Eq. 100 (1939) (upholding
constitutionality of a statute conferring similar equitable jurisdiction on State and local Boards of
Health). The memorandum also cited another serendipitous cause for optimism. Arthur T.
Vanderbilt-the counsel for the Complainants-Respondents-was now Chief Justice of the new
Supreme Court of New Jersey. See Injunction and Abatement Law in New Jersey (c.1939) (ASHA,
Legal Reference Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws, Social
Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
351. 283 F. 855 (D.N.J. 1922).
352. United States v. Reinking, 283 F. 855, 856 (D.NJ. 1922).
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strictures of the common law appeared "[in]sensible" 315 and "completely
archaic. 356 For many lawyers and laws students who had come of age in
the post-Littleton world there was an expectation that the concept of
"public" in a public nuisance action would be construed as broadly as
possible and that courts would defer to legislative extensions of equity
jurisdiction. 357 The rejection of Hedden is testimony to the evisceration of
the common law of public nuisance in American legal discourse. Public
nuisance law still existed, but many now believed that it could (and
should) be expanded to include private equitable actions.
Hedden ultimately proved to be a curious footnote in the ASHA's legal
war on behalf of the Red Light Abatement law. The Hedden opinion was
surprising because it came at a time when the ASHA thought the
constitutionality of these laws was all but settled. But it also proved to be
an opinion that could not turn back the clock on the transformation of
public nuisance law. With the exception of Hedden, the ASHA's legal
defense of the Red Light Abatement laws proved remarkably successful.
With its Standard Form and Model Brief, the ASHA provided a roadmap
for quick and easy passage of the Red Light Abatement laws and the
defense of their constitutionality. The result was a stunning transformation
of the American urban landscape. Whereas most major American cities
had red-light districts in 1910, by 1920 almost all of them were gone. The
war against the segregated vice district had been won.
D. Rhetorical Battles
Progressive era vice reform groups could never have won the war
against the segregated vice district without the assistance of state
legislatures. But what compelled state legislatures to pass Red Light
Abatement laws during second decade of the twentieth century? Clearly,
the white slavery panic put pressure on legislatures to do something about
prostitution. Likewise, the lobbying efforts of groups such as the
Committee of Fifteen played a role in securing passage of these laws.
Equally significant, however, was a change in attitude about the need for
segregated vice districts. In the era of the fallen woman, segregated vice
districts were seen as a necessary evil. They provided outlets for male
sexuality, kept prostitution from scattering into residential areas and
assisted law enforcement by concentrating criminal activity.358 Medical
355. Id- at 608 (criticizing Hedden as going against "the sensible conclusion of the American
courts.").
356. Injunction and Abatement Law in New Jersey (c.1939) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box
3, Folder 1: Injunction and Abatement, 1913-31, State Laws, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota) (commenting on the Hedden opinion).
357- But see Schofield, supra note 59, at 29 (arguing that equity jurisdiction is inappropriate for
public nuisance actions).
358. See supra Part lI.A.
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experts argued that a segregated vice district, combined with required
medical examinations, could eliminate the threat of venereal disease.
359
During the 19 1 Os proponents of the Red Light Abatement laws launched a
rhetorical war against these views. Once the rationales for segregated vice
districts were shown to be faulty, it became more palatable to pass
legislation that would ensure their destruction.
The CTCA made the most visible and sustained effort to dispel the
"male sexual necessity" doctrine. The Commission's campaign sought to
characterize the doctrine as a myth360 and to assure soldiers that
continence was compatible with "manhood" and "red-blooded virility.
361
In fact, the CTCA went to the other extreme and argued that sexual
activity drained men of their physical strength. "Over-exercise or
excitement of the sex-glands may exhaust and weaken a man.... The sex
feelings are so powerful and the risk so great if they are turned loose, that
it is common sense not to play with fire.362 The debunking of the male
necessity myth served two functions in the campaign against the
segregated vice district. First, by positing male sexual continence as the
norm, the debunking undermined the alleged threat that closing the red-
light districts posed to virtuous women. Second, opponents of the red-light
districts could now argue that but for the continued existence of these
districts, men would not be enticed into debauchery. By reversing the
assumptions about male sexuality, the Progressives reconceptualized the
red-light district as a "continuous advertisement of vice,"363 a "temptation
for somebody's boy"364 and a "constant lure to young men."
365 "The
known existence of a district tolerated by law, the 'mystery' of it to the
uninitiated, the ease of access - all these factors are a persistent lure to
men ... ."366 Instead of being a necessary outlet for sexual activity, the
district was now blamed for undermining the normal sexual continence of
American's young men.
Critics of the segregated vice district also attacked the notion that what
happened in the district could remain segregated from the rest of civilized
society. A constant refrain in vice reform literature was that "Segregation
359. Regulation of Prostitution, 33 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 6,6-7 (1916) (advocating fencing in the red-
light district and requiring compulsory examinations for venereal disease and the licensing of
prostitutes).
360. One medical officer called the doctrine "a grand old dodge with whiskers on it.... When I
hear a fellow pulling the old health yam, I'm inclined to keep him away from my sisters." BRANDT,
supra note 191, at 63.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 64.
363. ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against
Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140; ASHA, Segregation of Prostitution, supra note 144.
364. U.S. Public Health Service, An Open Forum on the "Open House ", supra note 173, at 7.
365. ASHA, Memorandum re New Jersey Injunction and Abatement Act, supra note 176, at 2.
366. ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against
Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140.
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does not segregate. ' 367 The segregation of vice was said to induce the
moral and financial corruption of the police,368 as well as lead to the
formation of powerful commercial vice interests which could threaten the
political order.36 9 Progressives further argued that the segregation of vice
did not just isolate crime, but magnified it.3"' Vice reform groups began to
describe segregated districts as a "breeding ground for crime,, 371 which
enabled criminals to organize on a vast scale. 3 2 Nor did segregation limit
the spread of venereal disease as proponents of the segregated vice district
had promised. Progressive social reformers charged that "Segregation is
disease spreading.- 37 3  They asserted that the European system of
regulation and medical inspection was a failure, and had deceived men
into a false sense of security. 3" The tragic result was that venereal disease
had slithered out from the segregated district and was infecting innocent
wives and children.
375
In response to these criticisms proponents of segregated vice districts
contended that closing the red-light districts would lead to the
"scatteration" of prostitution into civilized quarters of the city. One
response from the social reformers was that the empirical evidence did not
support this claim. 376 But, social reformers did not always dispute the
367. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 16 (1920); Note, The New Vice Crusade in
Atlanta, 2 J. Soc. HYGIENE 137, 137 (1916); ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the
Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140; ASHA, Segregation of
Prostitution, supra note 144.
368. See supra note 172-77 and accompanying text. See also ASHA, The Segregation of
Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140.
369. Nor was this claim sheer hyperbole. In California, vice interests launched a massive
disinformation campaign in an attempt to defeat the state's Red Light Abatement law. See Mary
Roberts Coolidge, California Women and the Abatement Law, 31 SURVEY 739 (1914); Franklin
Hichbom, California's Campaign Against Entrenched Vice, 32 SURVEY 430 (1914); Hichbom,
California's Fight for a Red Light Abatement Law, supra note 226, at 6; Hichborn, Organization that
Backed the California Red Light Abatement Bill, supra note 174; California Red-Light Law Still in
Doubt, 33 SURVEY 167 (1914-15).
370. ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against
Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140.
371. ASHA, Memorandum re New Jersey Injunction and Abatement Act, supra note 176, at 2. See
also U.S. Public Health Service, An Open Forum on the "Open House ", supra note 173, at 6.
372. Mayer, The Passing of the Red Light District - Vice Investigations and Results, supra note
296, at 198.
373. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 17 (1920).
374. B.P. AYDELOn-, THE SOCIAL EVIL 11-14 (Cincinnati, Western Tract and Book Society,
1871); THE VICE COMMISSION OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO, supra note 145, at 26;
Mayer, The Passing of the Red Light District - Vice Investigations and Results, supra note 296, at
198; Dr- W.A_ Evans, Address 2 VIGILANCE I, 6-7 (1912); ASHA, Memorandum re New Jersey
Injunction and Abatement Act, supra note 176, at 2; ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution and the
Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140.
375. ASHA, Segregation of Prostitution, supra note 144; ASHA, The Segregation of Prostitution
and the Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution, supra note 140; U.S. Public
Health Service, An Open Forum on the "'Open House "', supra note 173, at 6.
376. Facts About the Redlight Abatement Act, 3 (n.d.) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2,
Folder 15: Injunction and Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
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charges of scatteration. Instead, they attacked it on environmental justice
grounds. Sprinkled throughout the vice reform writings is a concern for
the disparate impact of vice districts on the poor and minority groups. The
Committee of Fifteen contended that "[t]here is no legal or moral
justification for giving consent to the prevalence of vice in one
neighborhood and objecting to it in another.... The poorer
neighborhoods, which are infested with vicious resorts, are as
'respectable' in many senses as are the districts so often referred to as
reputable residential districts." '377 Plus, the Committee retorted, the more
respectable neighborhoods were in a better position to prevent the inroads
of vice anyway. 378 The Vice Commission of Chicago alleged that
segregation of vice was tantamount to racial discrimination: "The apparent
discrimination against the colored citizens of the city in permitting vice to
be set down in their very midst is unjust, and abhorrent to all fair minded
people. Colored children should receive the same moral protection that
white children receive. 3 79 And in hearings before the Senate Committee
on Criminal Jurisprudence of Missouri, J. Lionberger Davis framed
support for the Red Light Abatement laws in equal protection terms:
This bill is democratic in the broadest sense of the word. It is not
paternal. It gives every man the power to protect himself and his home. It
will give a new meaning to the old phrase "the equal protection of the
law." At present that great guaranty of our state and federal constitution
has a hollow ring to the poor and oppressed who are without influence and
who must suffer from the grafting politician and the men and women who
"segregate" vice among the homes of the poor.380
The rhetorical assault against the segregated vice district offered early
twentieth-century American society an alternative vision of the segregated
vice district. Advocates of the vice districts had long argued that
segregation was necessary to protect civilized society from the baser
Minnesota) ("From my observation of the effect of the law," writes Assistant District Attorney A.B.
Comfort of Tacoma, "I do not think that it causes women to be scattered throughout the residence
section of the city any more than under the policy of maintaining a segregated district.").
377. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 14 (1917).
378. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 14 (1917). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN FOR THE YEAR 16 (1920) ("Segregation creates nests of crime usually in
the midst of a class of people who, by force of conditions, are perhaps most susceptible to the
influences of such surroundings."); ASHA, Memorandum re New Jersey Injunction and Abatement
Act, supra note 176, at 2 ("A segregated district is always in that section of a city where the poorer
class of people live. It is, therefore, a particular menace to the poor who most easily become the
victims of prostitution.").
379. THE VICE COMMISSION OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO 39 (1911).
380. Davis, supra note 145, at 11. See also Rufus S. Simmons, Address 2 VIGILANCE 1, 18-19
(1912) ("The infamous policy of 'segregation' which sets apart a district in the city where the laws
against these horrible crimes of lust and murder are not enforced, denies to the poor the equal
protection of the laws of the land."); Clarke, supra note 142, at 3, 5 ("There [are] also issues of plain
democracy involved. The segregated district [is] almost invariably located in the poorest sections of
the city, near the homes of laboring people. Frequently the homes of immigrant laborers [are] flanked
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elements. The social reformers, by contrast, constructed a vision of the
vice district as a festering cancer on civil society. Given time, this cancer
would infect the family, enslave the nation's daughters, enfeeble its
children, and destroy its law enforcement agencies and political
institutions. In the era of white slavery, this alternative counter-discourse
captured the public's imagination. The red-light district could no longer be
defended, because the arguments in its favor had been knocked down one-
by-one. The red-light district would have to be destroyed and the Red
Light Abatement laws would give citizens the tools to accomplish the
task.
CONCLUSION
By the 1920s, the red-light districts had passed from the American
landscape. Nor would they ever return. Of course, prostitution did not
disappear, it just became less visible. The bawdyhouse was replaced by
the hotel room, the tenement apartment, the roadhouse and the cabaret.
38 1
Prostitution also became more diffuse. Instead of being concentrated in a
particular district, prostitution retreated into what historian Kevin
Mumford has described as transient "interzones." 38 2 Usually located in
African-American neighborhoods, these interzones were "simultaneously
marginal and central" areas of cities, which Mumford suggests should be
conceptualized as a series of concentric circles, with the most stigmatized
vice located in the center." '383
With the closing of the public red-light districts and the concomitant
marginalization of prostitution into African-American communities, the
zeal that sustained the Progressive social reformers waned.3 4 The white
slavery menace had been defeated and America's (white) daughters had
been liberated from the segregated vice district. Given its pedigree, it is
somewhat tempting to dismiss the Red Light Abatement movement as
simply a bizarre manifestation of the white slavery panic that gripped
America in early twentieth century. While it is true that the Red Light
381. See, e.g, the Committee of Fifteen's increasing preoccupation in the 1920s with massage
parlors, immoral "stag" shows, and the "cabaret situation." See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
OF FIFTEEN 2-3, 12-14 (1922); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 8-10 (1925). The
cabaret was a catch-all phrase for speakeasies, roadhouses and "black and tan" cabarets. The latter
institution was of particular concern because it "brought bad elements of the white and colored people
together under inflammatory conditions and eventually that was certain to bring about a race collision,
which might easily have the most terrible consequences." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
FIFTEEN 12 (1922).
382. See KEVIN J. MUMFORD, INTERZONES: BLACK/WHITE SEX DISTRICTS IN CHICAGO AND NEW
YORK IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 19-35 (1997) (tracing the physical movement of red-light
districts into Harlem and South Side Chicago during the 1920s)
383. KEVIN J. MUMFORD, INTERZONES: BLACK/WIIITE SEX DISTRICTS IN CHICAGO AND NEW
YORK IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 20 (1997)
384. KEVIN J. MUMFORD, INTERZONES: BLACK/WHITE SEX DISTRICTS IN CHICAGO AND NEW
YORK IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 20 (1997).
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Abatement laws are inextricably linked to transformations in the social
construction of the prostitute during this period, the underlying
communitarian conception of property expressed in these laws still
resonates.
385
A theme that runs throughout the Progressive era writings on the Red
Light Abatement laws is the need to hold property owners accountable.
Proponents of the Red Light Abatement laws rebelled against the idea that
property rights entitled the owner to use his or her property in a socially
undesirable manner: "[The property owner] can not escape his
responsibility for actively or passively permitting the use of his property
for the purpose of prostitution, together with the sharing in its
proceeds." 386 To the Progressive mind, property was more than just a
bundle of rights, it also was a bundle of obligations. Words such as "duty"
are common in Progressive writings on property ownership and reflect this
communitarian outlook:
It is [the property owner's] duty to see that his premises are not
applied to the unlawful use, and it is equally the right of the law to
have him take such action as will prevent their being so used....
[T]he law does not protect persons in the ownership of property, and
then permit them to absolve themselves from all obligation in respect
to the uses to which it is applied. Ownership carries its duties as well
as its benefits. One of them is to keep the property from a use which
is unlawful. It is imposed upon the owner because that is where it
ought to rest.
387
The Red Light Abatement laws put property owners on notice that they
could no longer shirk their "duties" of property ownership. 388 With
385. The merger of public and private rights in the Red Light Abatement law represents an early
instance of a self-consciously communitarian conception of property that is advocated by some
modem scholars. See, e.g., JOSEPH SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS
OF OWNERSHIP (2000); JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000);
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN
AGENDA (1993); Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 208
(2002); Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government- The
Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857 (2000).
386. George E. Worthington, Injunction and Abatement Law Against Houses of Prostitution, 3
UNITED LEAGUE NEWS 1, 1 (1923). In addition to the Red Light Abatement laws, social reformers also
promoted the "Tin Plate" ordinance as a means of ensuring accountability. First enacted in Portland,
Oregon, the Tin Plate ordinance required that the front of every building post a "conspicuous plate or
sign bearing the name and address of the owner or owners of the building." The 'Injunction Law' and
the 'Tin Plate Ordinance', I (n.d.) (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Injunction and
Abatement, 1925-53, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota). The appeal of the
Tin Plate ordinance was two-fold: it established ownership for Red Light Abatement actions and it
made public the names of owners. Id. (noting that one of the greatest impediments to enforcement of
the Injunction and Abatement laws is establishing that the accused is the owner of the property).
387. George E. Worthington, Memorandum of March 29, 1921, at 2 (ASHA, Legal Reference
Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24, Social Welfare History Archives,
University of Minnesota) (emphasis mine).
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virtually every member of a jurisdiction empowered to enforce these
duties, the laws provided an effective means of enforcing communal
obligations.
Although the red lights have long since been extinguished, the
Progressive social reformers who promoted the Red Light Abatement laws
left behind an alternative conception of property relations. Through a
transformation of public nuisance law, Progressive reformers articulated a
communitarian vision in which the line separating public and private
interests vanished. Whether such a vision has a place in American society
today remains an open question. What the history of the Red Light
Abatement laws reveals is that when this vision is combined with
powerful social forces, public nuisance law can be a potent legal tool for
transforming the world in which we live.
responsibility for its future use. He cannot say that because he was unaware that it had become a
public nuisance, the nuisance may not be restrained and its further existence prevented by an
injunction running directly against him...." George E. Worthington, Memorandum of March 29,
1921, at 2 (ASHA, Legal Reference Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Injunction and Abatement, 1911-24,
Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota).
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